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ABSTRACT

In the standard common agency model of politics, the interest groups always
lobby a single policy-making entity for policy favor. To deal with this unreality, I step in
some issues about the trade policy making that is entangled with the multiplicity of public
decision-makers. My study cooperates multi-agent and the common agency model to
analyze the trade policy making under the political system that is controlled by a number
of lawmakers. The analysis points out that the committee of symmetric lawmakers
behaves like a single government but the equilibrium policy is not efficient. Because the
presence of multiple players on the both sides, lobbies and lawmakers, creates the
strategic externalities among lawmakers, it is impossible for all the players to achieve the
optimum of their sum bliss. Moreover, focusing on the phenomena of the bipartisan
corruption in the United States, I examine the fund-raising race between two parties in
the bipartisan political system. If collecting political money implies that the party sells its
service to the rent seekers, the party’s popularity will fade as its fund raising activity is
more vigorous than its opponent’s is. The interaction between two political parties is
modeled as a differential game. The results show that the subgame perfect equilibrium
considerably lifts political money collecting activity compared with time consistent. This
partially explains why the political parties ignore the public’s criticism on their soft
money collecting activities and engage in an ever-escalating fund raising race. Finally, I
apply the common agency model and Nash bargaining process to analyze the
immigration policy of a small country. Our results show that, under incomplete political
economy, the political equilibrium is to set up quantitative restrictions on the inflow of
foreign labors. If the marginal cost of deterring illegal immigrants can be covered by the
marginal benefit of allowing legal immigrants for entry, setting an optimal border control
vii
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to deter the illegal immigrants from entry and simultaneously allowing a certain level of
legal foreign labor for entry is the political equilibrium. The bargaining power of
government does not affect the immigration policy, but in the long run it does.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Influence-Driven Contribution Model

In recent years there have been considerable works devoted to developing a
positive theory of policy-making, whose emphasis is on modeling the political process by
which public policy is made and examining the policy that emerges as the equilibrium of
this process. The research in this field provides a number of political economy
approaches on its focus, such as majority voting (Mayer 1984), lobbying (Hillman 1982
and 1988) and electoral competition (Magee, Brock and Young 1989). The modem
democracies have two noticeable features: the political campaign contributions serve an
important role in enhancing the politicians' chance of being elected or re-elected, and the
activities of rent seeking have a prominent part for inducing the government to create
market inefficiencies and distortions. However, most of the political economy approaches
can not link satisfactorily the motive for campaign contribution to the activities of rent
seeking. An exception is the influence-drive contribution model. It is beyond the
approach that individual contribution is to aim on electoral outcome, while argues that
political contributions are designed to influence the choice of policy than to influence
election outcome. Since the individual political contribution has marginal effect on the
election outcomes of modem democracies, the model of influence-drive contribution has
more solid theoretic ground than the others do in building up a positive theory of policy
making.
In the particularly appealing and useful model of Grossman and Helpman (1994),
they portray a policy maker, who takes bid on trade policy from organized interested
group. The relationship between government and lobby groups is modeled as a common
agency of politics. The basic idea of this model is based on the observation that in the
1
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modern democracies the opportunistic politicians have nothing to sell but their policies,
and meanwhile a politician's professional and personal success is often tied to financial
contribution.
In my dissertation, I engage in three works based on the structure and ideas of
Grossman and Helpman (1994). First, I extend their structure of common agency model
to deal the multi-principal, multi-agent problem that arises in the political economy of
trade policy. Second, I expand their idea, which the politicians' success are tied to
financial contribution under the modem democracy, to expose the phenomenon that the
political parties ignore the fierce public criticism of collecting soft money and still chase
it. In the final part, I directly apply their structure to analyze the issues that are
concerning the immigration policy of a small country.
1.2 An Extension of Common Agency Model to a Multi-Agent, Multi-Principal
Problem

The common agency model of politics, as developed by Grossman and Helpman
(1994), produces some keen insights in the topic of special-interest group politics. It is
well suited to analyze the structure of economic policy across a set of industries and to
examine the choice between various policy instruments (Dixit 1996, Dixit, Grossman and
Helpman 1998, and Aidt 1998). In these models, the interest groups always lobby a
single policy-making entity for policy favors. However, in reality, there hardly exists
such a simple political system. The modem democracies are often involved legislative
activities, which are related to the allocation of policy jurisdiction across legislators
serving as ministers or committee chairs; in other worlds, the public policies are made by
a number of public decision-makers.

2
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In the second chapter "Lobby and Policy Decision-Makers: An Application to
Trade Policies", I analyze some issues about the trade-policy-makings that are entangled
with the multiplicity of public decision-makers. Based on some recent works on multiple
agents (McAfee and Schwart 1994, Segal 1999, and Prat and Rustichini 1999), the study
is cooperated multi-agent with common agency to analyze trade policy-making under the
political system that is controlled by a number of powerful legislators or ministers. The
political process is featured by a sequence of games in which each lobby is connected
with a number of public decision-makers. My results show that the committee of
symmetric lawmakers behaves like a single political entity but the equilibrium policies
are not efficient. Because the presence of multiple players on the both sides (lobbies and
lawmakers) creates a strategic externality, it is impossible for all the players to achieve
the optimum of their sum bliss.
1.3 Modeling the Fund Raising Race between Two Competing Political Parties

To collect political money to finance the electoral expenditure, the incumbent
politician, portrayed as in Grossman and Helpman (1994), takes the strategy, "seeking
rents by creating rents". In fact, no matter which party is in rule, it seems unavoidable
that the politicians from political party collect soft money to finance campaigns.
However, the interest groups may influence the government’s policy making via the
political contribution, and the corruption emerges in the interactions between politicians
and special interests. Recently, the general public has fiercely criticized that the soft
money is a main access for interest groups to corrupting the politicians from the
Republican and Democrat. But, in the bipartisan system of the United States of America,
the both parties ignore the criticisms and compete the soft money to finance the
campaigns like an arm race. The political parties fund raising race have been the public
3
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issue for a decade, but it is rare for the current economists to investigate the pervasive
bipartisan corruption in a democracy, which the popularity and political contribution have
impacts on the politicians’ chance of being elected or re-elected.
In the third chapter "The Dynamics of Political Fund Raising Race: A Differential
Game", I take a close look at the phenomenon that two political parties engage in fund
raising race in spite of the fact, which collecting political moneys hurts political parties'
popularity. The basic model we adopt is that of Feichtinger and Wirl (1994) in which the
incumbent party has to trade off between popularity and political money collection. In my
model, if a party's fund-raising activity is more vigorous than its opponent is, its
popularity gets damaged. The intertemporal interactions between the two competing
political parties are modeled as a differential game. My main conclusion is that: (a) If the
competing parties are very similar to each other, they trash their popularity, and (b) the
fund raising activity is considerably higher under subgame perfect equilibrium than under
time consistent. These provide a partial explanation of why the political parties ignore the
fierce public criticism of their soft money collections and continue to involve themselves
in fund-raising race.
1.4 An Application of Common Agency Model to Immigration Policy
One often observes a host country permitting some legal entries of foreign labors
and simultaneously deterring the illegal entries of foreign labors. This observation gives
rise to two related puzzles. Puzzle 1: An optimal policy for a small country concerning
labor mobility is to let foreign labor in until the marginal labor product is driven down to
the foreign wage. That implies that all foreign labor should be legally admitted for a
national optimum. Puzzle 2: If for some reason illegal entry should be deterred, why
allow for legal entry of foreign labors. The existing models cannot account for the
4
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simultaneous existence of legal and illegal immigrants and hence cannot answer these
two puzzles. They either do not distinguish two types of labor or assume that legal labor
is non-existent or outside the model (for example, Ethier 1986, Bond and Chen 1987, and
Djajic 1997).
In the final chapter "Immigration, Border Control and the Relative Bargaining
Power of Government under Lobbying Process", I incorporate the common agency mode
of Grossman and Helpman (1994) into the framework of Ethier (1986) to explain the
puzzles mentioned in the previous paragraph. Since the model's basic setup about the
political economy is based on the framework of Grossman and Helpman (1994), it
inherits an extreme characteristic: the government has monopoly power in relation to
multi-lobby. To relieve this uncomfortable feature, I further expand my one sector setting
to multi-sector and portray the govemment-lobby negotiation as a Nash bargaining
process. My results show that: If the production factors are not all presented by the
lobbies, the political equilibrium is to set up a quantitative restriction on the inflow of
foreign labors. If the marginal cost of deterring illegal immigrants can be covered by the
marginal benefit of allowing legal immigrant for entry, deterring illegal entry of foreign
labors to allow a certain level of foreign labors for legal entry is the host country's
political equilibrium. Furthermore, I show that in the short run the relative bargaining
power of the government only affects the distribution of the surplus, derived from the
political process, between the government and the lobby; however, it affects the
immigration policy of host country in the long run.

5
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CHAPTER 2. LOBBYING AND POLICY DECISION-MAKERS:
AN APPLICATION TO TRADE POLICIES

2.1 Introduction
In the standard common-agency model of politics, the interest groups always
lobby a single policy-making entity for policy favors. However, in reality, there hardly
exists such a simple political system. In modem democracies, they involve legislative
activities, which are often related to the allocation of policy jurisdiction across legislators
serving as ministers or committee chairs; in other words, the policy decisions are made
by a number of public decision-makers. There are scarce works that try to integrate multidecision-makers into the lobbying process.
An Exception is the work Helpman and Persson (1998). However, their
assumption that each public decision-maker of the political system is associated with a
particular interest group, harks back to the original common agency model, and rendering
it unable to analyze multi-principal, multi-agent interactions. In this paper, we extend
some recent work on multiple agents (McAfee and Schwartz 1994, Segal 1999, Prat and
Rustichini 1999) to the common agency setting and to analyze policy-making under the
political systems that are controlled by a number of powerful legislators or ministers.
In our model, we assume that some of the groups in society are organized and
able to make implicit offers to influence the trade policies. The decisions of public
policies are brought up under a US-style congressional system or a European-style
parliamentary system by combining every individual policy proposal of lawmakers into
the final one.
Under the collectivized decision-making process, for every public issue, there is a
weight corresponding to the policy proposal of each individual lawmaker. The weight is

6
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exogenous and reflects the seniority of individual lawmaker in political system. However,
to simplify our analysis, we assume that the lawmakers equally share the power of
deciding the public policies.
Given the specific rules of political system decision-making, the political
contributions are made strategically to influence the design of individual lawmaker's
policy proposals and the collective policy decisions in the political system. Moreover, we
assume that every individual lawmaker is concerned with the weighed sum of the
aggregate social welfare and the total contribution he receives. Hence there are
externalities among individual lawmakers because each lawmaker's utility depends not
only on his own policy proposal but also on the other lawmakers' proposal. In this
process, a set of lawmakers makes the decisions that affect the payoffs of a set of interest
groups, while the lobbies can influence the decision of lawmakers by means of monetary
inducements.
In what follows, I assume that a number of lawmakers collectively decide the
trade policy in a small country. The economy is assumed to have the Ricardo-Viner
structure. In Section 2.2, we portray an economy that the trade policy is a result of linear
convex combination of the lawmakers' policy proposals. We consider that an interest
group lobbies a trade policy committee for favors. We model the relationship between the
committee of trade policies and the interest group as a game played through agents.
Specifically, this game includes a principal and a set of agents. Under the assumption that
the lawmakers are symmetric, we confirm that each lawmaker who holds passive belief
will behave as if it were maximizing a social welfare that weighs the bliss of interest
group more heavily. Moreover, we also show that because of the strategic externalities,

7
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the domestic prices depart from free trade more under the equilibrium policy proposal
profiles than under the efficient policy proposal profiles.
In Section 2.3, we introduce multi-agent into our model. Since each lawmaker
holds passive beliefs, she or he is isolated as a common agency in the lobbying process.
Thus, the entangled interactions between multi-principal and multi-agent are resolved by
imposing constraint on the agents' beliefs. It is different from the work of Grossman and
Helpman (1996), in which they imposed some specific beliefs to the principals. The
results of our analysis reinforce the result of Grossman and Helpman (1994).
Overall, the analysis points out that the committee of symmetric lawmakers
behaves like a single government but the equilibrium policies are not efficient. Because
the presence of multiple players on the both sides creates a strategic externality, it is
impossible for all the players to achieve the optimal of the sum bliss of interest groups
and lawmakers. Moreover, the strategic externality also makes the interior solution hard
to find.
2.2 The Model
Consider a small economy that the populations size N. In this economy each
individual has a utility function
u(h) = h0 + 2 > A )

(2.1)

/= i

where ht is the consumption of product i and ut is an increase concave function. He
spends his income to consume n+1 kind of goods. Good 0 is produced with labor alone
and serve as numeraire, whose price is equal to unity. Each non-numeraire sector / uses
labor and the sector specific capital to produce good /. With the wage rate fixed at one,

8
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the aggregate reward to the specific factor used in produce good / depends on the
domestic price of that good, pi. This reward is denoted by n,(pt).
The consumer surplus from good / for an individual is St z u ,
where d,(p,) is an individual's demand for good /. The net import demand function is
denoted by mt =

(p,), where y,(pt) is the domestic output of good i. The

net revenue from sector fs tariffs or subsidies that is expressed on a per-capita basis, is
given by /•(/>,)s (pt - p*)[di( p J - y t i p J / N ] wherep* is the world price for goods i.
Consequently, we can define ad valorem trade taxes or subsidies to be /, = (p, - p * )/p * .
Moreover, suppose that the government redistributes the tariff revenue equally to every
individual in a lump-sum fashion.
We can express the joint welfare, gross of the contributions, as
Wt =qt +*, +a,AT{]TS,(/>,) + £/;(/>,)}
f=i
f=i
where p is a vector, (pi, p^ ... ,pn). The first term on the right hand side qt is the total
labor supply of the specific input used in industry r, and the last term represent their share
in tariff rebates and in consumer surplus, in which at is the fraction of the population that
own factor /. The aggregate gross welfare W equals aggregate income plus trade tax
revenues and total consumer surplus; that is,
W(p) =

(P) + N & S M +
(=1

1=1

/=!

(Pi)} •
(=1

Now, consider an economy in which the professional and personal success of a
politician under the institutions of representative democracy is tied to the financial
contributions of some special interests. We assume that in some exogenous set of sectors,

9
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denoted L, the specific-factor owners have overcome the free-rider problems and been
able to organize themselves into lobby groups. More specifically, the set of interest
groups is denoted asL = {1,2,...,/}.
Moreover, we assume that the interest groups can make deals with a set of
lawmakers, denoted Z = {1,2,.../}. To simplify our analysis, we assume that the
domestic price of product in sector / is decided by a linear combination of the individual
lawmakers’ policy proposals. In this simple linear process, the lawmaker / s tariff
proposal about sector / is denoted by Py eA,y where Aff is a continuous compact subset of
R, real number; that is A,y = [£ (/,/>/;]. Let the vector Pt ={PiX,Pnt...,Pix)& A(I x...x Ate
denote the lawmakers’ policy proposal profiles concerning the domestic price of sector
/’s product. Let A( = II y=IA,y and P = {PU..PH). Moreover, let Ay s II"=1Atf. Let
P ‘ = (Pl,...,Pll) e A; denote the lawmaker/s policy proposal vector.
Next, we assume that each lawmaker j has equal power on the setup of domestic
prices, and thus his tariff proposal for sector /, Py is weighed by l/z. Then, we can write
the domestic price in sector / to be

A-7&V2 /=i
The sector / lobby raises money from its members to influence the policy outcome
p. Its political contributions depend on the policy proposal vectors proposed by individual
lawmakers. Unlike the standard common agency model, the interest groups in our model
may lobby more than one lawmaker. Let Qj(Pij,..,P$) be the contribution schedule
offered by lobby i to lawmaker j. The joint welfare of lobby group

i ’s

member can be

expressed as

10
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K=frt - Z c, .

(2.2)

y=i
Each lobby maximizes the total welfare of its member via their contribution schedules.
Each lawmaker cares about the total level of political contributions and the well being of
the general public. As in Grossman and Helpman 1994, we choose a linear form for the
lawmaker/ s objective function, namely
G ,= ± C ,+ a ,W { P )

(2.3)

i= l

where a, is a parameter that represents the marginal rate of substitution between welfare
and contribution.
The non-cooperative game takes place in two stages: first the lobbies
simultaneously pick out their political contribution schedules, and each lobby r makes
each lawmaker j an offer Q which is privately observed by the lawmaker. Lawmaker j
observes his own contribution schedule vector Q = {C//}/d offered by the lobbies and
forms beliefs rj(Cj) about the contribution schedules made to the other lawmakers. In the
second stage, the lawmakers propose policy proposals simultaneously.
We focus on the Perfect-Bayesian Equilibrium, in which each lawmaker sets a
policy proposal vector to maximize his objective Gj contingent on given contribution
schedules and his beliefs. Each lobby / sets up a set of contribution schedule vectors to
maximize the joint welfare of its members, taking the other lobbies' schedules as given.
2.2.1 One Interest Group and Lawmakers
We start our analysis by studying the case in which there is a unique interest
group g and a number of individual lawmakers z. Here, the game is similar to the
unobservable game of McAfee and Schwartz 1994. The lobbies offer political

11
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contributions to the lawmakers simultaneously and secretly, and the lawmakers never
learn the others' deals. Each lawmaker f s object function is Q , + ajW(P) and the lobby
group g’s joint welfare is Wg -

,Crf .

In this two-stage game, we focus on the pure-strategy, perfect Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium. When a lawmaker receives an off-equilibrium-path offer, arbitrary belief can
be assign to the unobservable offers made to others. Then, the multiplicity of equilibria
appears. To construct an accurate and complete prediction, we need to pin the belief on
out-equilibrium-path on some certain domain. Following the suggestion of McAfee and
Schwartz, we assume that the lawmakers interpret any unexpected offers as trembles and
believe that they are uncorrelated. In other word, each lawmaker hold so called passive
beliefs: when a lawmaker receives a political contribution different from what is expected
in the candidate equilibrium, he believes that the other lawmakers face their equilibrium
political contributions.
Consider the lobby g's incentive to deviate from an equilibrium outcome
{C0 }JCZ, {Pt }ie{1(1(. Since the lobby group can offer zero contribution to any lawmaker
whose policy proposal is free trade for all sectors, we can focus on the deviations in
which all lawmakers accept their offers. Holding passive beliefs, each lawmaker j makes
policy proposal P = {PjJ

t

and accepts political contribution Ca if and only if

CB +aJW(PJ,P~J)ZajW(p*,P~J) where P~‘ is the others' policy proposal vector.
The lobby g’s optimal deviation should maximize the welfare of its member subject to
these participation constraints:

12
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subject to Ct +aj W(PJ,P~i ) > ajW{p*,p-J) for allj e Z
( {Ca };6z»

}ie{u,<.)) >s an equilibrium outcome if and only if the lobby does not want to

deviate from it; that is, it solves this program.
Given any P, the lobby g will set its political contributions so that the cost of
implementing this policy proposal is the minimum. Consequently all the participation
constraints must bind. We can use the binding constraints to express the political
contributions in the lawmakers' utility, and substitute them into the objective function.
Since ajW(p*,P'J) is constant in this program, the policy proposal vector {Pi
can be sustained in equilibrium if and only if the vector satisfies the following condition:
W

'r,(.F)+'Za,W(.P‘,P ‘ ).

(2.4)

Let £1 denote the set in which every policy proposal profile satisfies (2.4) and is an
t

^

interior solution. When Atf is an interval and ffrg( P ) + ^ a Jffr(P/ tP~/ ) is continuous in
;=i

pj p -i)

quasi-concave in P, the set for (2.4) is not empty (see the proof in the

Appendix 2 of Segal 1999). The program of (2.4) is equivalent to the following
condition:

for all j e Z. As a result, the program (2.4) says that, in equilibrium, the lobby's political
contribution will induce each lawmaker j, who holds passive belief, to behave as if he
were maximizing a social welfare function that weighs the interest group's welfare more
comparing with those not so represented.

13
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We can interpret the program (2.4) as each lawmaker j puts weight 1 + ay on
sector g and ay on the others. The results show that each lawmaker's optimizing behavior
is similar to that of the single policy-maker in Grossman and Helpman (1994).
Now, we can portray the interior equilibrium trade policy supported by the
differentiable contribution schedules. Given the differentiability and the fact that the
equilibrium is in the interior, we have the first order conditions for (2.4):
I

VWg(P) + 'jraJVW(Pi ,P~i ) = 0

(2.5)

where the operator V applied to a function denotes the gradient vector of the partial
derivatives of the function with respect to the vector argument that appear as the subscript
of the operator.
From Eq. (2.S), we can evaluate the effect of each lawmaker's marginal policy
proposal change on the various groups' welfare by separately calculating VWg(P) and
VW(PJ,P~J) and combining them. For interest group g we have

(2.6)

where mg(j>g) ^ N d g{j>g) ~ y g{pg) is the net import demand function. Eq. (2.6) states
that an increase in the lawmaker/s domestic price proposal of sector g above the free
trade level can increase the interest group g’s welfare. However, each lawmaker / s
marginal policy proposal only has a partial effect on the domestic price of sector g that
depends on his power in political system, and hence the marginal effect is discounted by
l/z. Moreover, for the aggregate welfare, we have
(2.7)

14
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Eq. (2.7) shows that the marginal deadweight loss, which is caused by each lawmaker f s
policy proposal change, increases as the economy is more distorted.
Plugging (2.6) and (2.7) into (2.5), we have:
0 - a t )yt (Pt ) + a t (Pt

(j>g)+aj(Pt ~P't )r»i (Pt ) = 0.

(2.8a)

For / * g, we have
- a ty ,ip ,y +«,(/>, - p 'W i i P t ) +(!,[(#, - p ' W M = 0.

(2.8b)

Eqs. (2.8) tell us that if aj is not identical for all j, there does not exist a pure strategy,
interior Bayesian Nash equilibrium. However, if ay is equal to a constant a for all j e Z,
the first order condition of (2.4) with respect to /*, will be identical. Therefore, we
assume that every lawmaker is symmetrical for the rest of our analysis.
Since the lawmakers have the same objective function, the policies of the political
system are the same as that of a single policy-making entity. Furthermore, in equilibrium,
the trade policy satisfies
X
1+/,

- i z a i

(2.9)

a + a t e(

where if / = g, h = 1; otherwise, // = 0. In (9) s, = y tip,)/m,ip,) the equilibrium ratio of
domestic output to import and et =m,(pi) p ilmi(pt) is the elasticity of import demand
or export supply. Eq. (2.9) is identical to the equation for the equilibrium tariff rate found
in Proposition 1 of Grossman and Helpman (1994).
Dixit et al. (1996) argue that if the government’s objective weighs positively the
well being of all members in society, then the efficiency for the government and lobbies
can be achieved under the lobbying process. However, in this secret game, the efficiency
that the relevant parties or players succeed in maximizing their joint surplus is not
15

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

accomplished under the multi-lawmaker political process. Adding up the objectives of
lawmakers and interest group, we have the joint surplus of the lawmakers and interest
groups, Wg(P)+ £aJV(P). Let A denote the set of lawmakers' policy proposal
j=i

maximizing the total surplus of identical lawmakers and interest group:

A = »g m
P eA ,« ..» A .
1 "

a
;=1

*

“

x

( 210)

Moreover, let v|/ be the set in which every policy proposal profile satisfies (10)and is an
interior solution. Let Q = {

(

1

.......... e ¥} denote the set of interior

efficient domestic prices.
The first-order condition of (2.10) can be express as: for i = g

0 - a g)yt (Pg) + a t (Pt - P]

(P, )+«*(/>, - p \ )mg(p g) = 0

and for i * g
- a j M + O ' i p , -p*)m i{pi) + zc^{pi -p*)m i(j>i) = 0.
Then, we can calculate the interior efficient trade policy
t°i _ Ij - a , <
l+ tf za+ ai e°

(2.11)

where (s°,e°) has the same definition as (£,,£,).
Since each lawmaker's objective function has a weight on the aggregate welfare of
the general public, his policy proposal change causes externalities on other lawmakers'
objective function. Moreover, the game is secretly played by players in the model, and
hence the lobby can not publicly commit to her bilateral offers. As a result, the
externalities will be presented at an efficient policy proposal profile, and the lobby g that
16
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can not commit to compensate lawmakers for these externalities has an incentive to
deviate from this policy proposal profile.
Each lawmaker’s policy proposal has partial impact on the trade policy, which
affects every sector in this economy. The externalities among lawmakers are presented if
each lawmaker puts forward a policy proposal, which has the same distortion direction as
the others’ proposals do. Specifically, for the sector g each lawmaker proposes a positive
tax proposal (tariff) for the import, while for sector / * g each lawmaker proposes a
negative tax (subsidy) for the import. In other world, the externalities among lawmakers
are caused by the lawmakers’ policy proposals, which have multi-dimensional. In Segal
(1999) every agent’s trade profile is one- dimensional; however, in our model the policy
profiles of lawmakers are a multi-dimensional. Therefore, giving a little modification of
the term in Segal (1999) seems necessary. Let A*y = [Pff,p '] f o r /* g and A*y ^ [ p ',P v\
for / = g. From Eqs. (2.9) and (2.11), the lawmaker/ s equilibrium trade policy proposal
Pt] and efficient trade policy proposal Pv for sector/ belong to A*tf.
Definition. The externality on efficient policy proposal profile are negative in absolute
value if for all P s ¥ and each lawmaker j, afV(Pj ,P~J) is non-increasing in the
absolute value of P& - p * e A*^ - p* for all k * j and all /e{ l,
Since we assume the country is small enough not to affect the world price,
increasing the distortion of domestic price decreases the aggregate welfare no matter it is
tariff or subsidy. Consequently, that the externalities on efficient policy proposal profile
are negative in absolute value can be applied to our model. Let denote the set of interior

17

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

equilibrium domestic prices. Let E = { ( 1 / z . 1

/

P^),P e Q} denote the set

of interior equilibrium domestic prices.
One would like to speculate that with the negative externalities on efficient policy
proposal profile, the equilibrium tariffs and subsidies are higher than the efficient levels.
Of course, this could be shown by comparing the first order conditions of (2.4) and
(2.10). However, the set £ and Q may not be single-point set. Suggested by Topkis 1998,
using the strong set order to do the comparison between two sets may be more natural
than using the first-order conditions. The definition of strong set order is that: namely,
for two sets A and 3, we will say that A<,B if whenever c e A , deB and c ^ d , we must
also have ceB and deA. Let |£| denote the set that is constituted by the points, whose
every coordinate is the absolute value of the coordinate of the points from E
Proposition 1. If each lawmaker is symmetric, |£ - p '| U

j(? - p'\ ^\Q ~ P*| •

Proof. Suppose that |p - p '|e |Q - p * | and |p - p * |€ |£ - p * |u |Q - p * |, and that
Since
\ p - p ’\&^E-p*|U |Q - p *| trivially, the strong set order comparison only require that
p - p '\z \Q -p '\.
Since Ptj, Ptj belong to A*tf
A* =[£,’,P9]

for

|Pi ~ P i | = 1 / ^ = 1

i =g ,

there

for i * g
exists

and Pv,?v belong to

P( e A*, x...xA*„

such

~ p ' ~ \ Pi ~ p ‘ \ ■Then’ w e 03X1 write

18
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that

irt <P>+Za* ( n - w' < n * I . aW0 >,, r l ) i * r,(p)+'Z<iW(!s ,, r 1)

> W,(P)+'^aWiP‘,p-i) = IVl (P)+'£air(P).
The first inequality obtains from the equilibrium condition (2.4), the second from the fact
that the externalities on efficient policy proposal profile are negative in absolute value,
and the last equality is from the assumption that the domestic price is equal to a linear
combination of lawmakers' policy proposals. Consequently, p e Q , which implies

Proposition 1 tells us the direction of distortion that the domestic prices are more
away from free trade when the equilibrium policy proposal profiles are deployed than
when the efficient policy proposal profiles are unfolded. In Grossman and Helpman 1994,
the equilibrium supported by truthful strategies is efficient in viewing the joint surplus of
all active players in their model. Since the government is the exclusive agent, there is no
externality for its policy.
However, the equilibrium supported by the passive beliefs is not efficient, and the
deal between the interest group and each lawmaker is secret. The inefficiencies emerge
since the interest group cannot publicly commit its bilateral offers and also is not able to
compensate the lawmakers for the externalities imposed on them. Given the efficient
policy proposal profiles, the interest group has incentives to renegotiate with some
lawmakers once the others accept their efficient policy proposal profiles. The equilibrium
policy proposal profiles are the outcome after the interest group deliberates the
profitability of multi-agent deviations.

19
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The deals between interest group and lawmakers are secretly initiated, and each
lawmaker holds passive belief when receives an off-equi 1ibrium-path offer, so there is no
interaction among lawmakers. The interest group can take advantage of the lawmakers’
failure to coordinate their policy profiles, and capture all the surplus of lobbying process.
The political money contributed by interest group is no more than what keeps lawmakers’
utilities in the status quo, in which the lawmakers bear no political pressure from the
interest group. Each inactive lawmaker can not get compensated about the externalities
caused by the secret bilateral trades between interest group and the other lawmakers, and
meanwhile the externalities produce inefficiencies.
In next subsection, we analyze the situation in which the lawmakers can
coordinate their policy proposals to forming while facing the interest group. The analysis
can help us illustrate how the lawmakers’ internalization of externalities can eliminate the
inefficiency.
2.2.2 The Efficiency and the Coordination among Lawmakers

Since each lawmaker’s policy proposal has impact on other lawmakers’ utilities,
the externalities among lawmakers arise. Moreover the lawmakers’ passive beliefs about
off-equilibrium-path offer and secret bilateral trades between interest group and
lawmakers enable the interest group to extract the surplus of lobbying process without
compensating lawmakers for the externalities. Pondering the adverse position dealing
with interest group and the externalities, the lawmakers collude with each other to design
the trade policy.
Facing the lawmakers’ collusion, the interest group g donates political
contribution contingent on the policy vector proposed by the coalition of lawmakers. Let

20
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C(p) be the contribution schedule offered by interest group j. The joint welfare of lobby
group g’s member can be express as

Vt = wt -C(p).
Here, we assume that the coalition of lawmakers equally distributes the political
contribution to its members. The lawmaker/ s objective function is
Gj = —C(p)+aW(p).
z
The coalition of lawmakers has the objective function

G = C(p) + zaW(p).
The coalition of lawmakers accepts political contribution C if and only if
C + zaW(p) £ zaW{p*).
The lobby g’s optimal inducement to the government’s decision about trade policy should
maximize the welfare of its member subject to the participation constraint:
M a x W (p )-C (p )
9

subject to C + zaW(p) £ zaW(p*).
A

(C, p) is an equilibrium outcome if and only if it solve this program.
Since lobby g will set its political contribution so that the cost of implementing
any trade policy is the minimum, the participation constraint must bind. Here, zaW (p*)
is constant, so the trade policy vector p can be sustain in equilibrium if and only if the
vector satisfies the following condition:
/? e arg max Wt (p)+zaW(p).
9

(2.12)

*

The first order condition of interior solution for (2.12) is the same as that for (2.10). So,
when the lawmakers can coordinate their policy proposals, each lawmaker’s welfare
21
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change, caused by the trade policy change, is compensated. The lawmakers’ collusion
does not only enable the lawmakers to improve their welfare, but also nullify the
externalities produced by the secret bilateral trade between interest group and lawmakers.
After the lawmakers internalize their trade policy proposals, the interest group must
compensate every lawmaker’s welfare change caused by the policy change. The interest
group can not impose externalities in the lawmakers via the secret deals, and hence the
efficiency comes out from the lobbying process.
2.3 Several Interest Groups and Lawmakers

We have so far examined the situation in which a single interest group lobbies a
number of symmetrical individual lawmakers. The simplification helps us avoid some
complications, which are involved several interest groups with opposing interests.
However, it misses something important in an economy in which a number of organized
interest groups design contributions to influence the lawmakers' choice about the trade
policy. Since there are more than one interest group in the economy, none of the interest
group possesses the privilege of exclusively dealing with the lawmakers. Thus the
interest groups may not extract the entire surplus from its political relationship with the
lawmakers. On the other hand, even though the deals between individual lawmaker the
interest groups are secreted, he can still make use of the rivalry among interest groups to
capture the surplus of lobbing process conditional on his belief of the other lawmakers’
deals. Also, the interactions among interest groups can evoke them to communicate with
each other. The equilibrium under the scenario of multi*principal, multi-agent must face
the test that is triggered by the lobbies’ incentive to communicate among them with the
intention of arranging a stable, mutually preferable joint deviation.

22
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To consider this realism, we assume that there are more than one interest group in
this economy; that is, L = {1,...,/}, where / £ 2. As in the previous subsection, the game is
secretly played by the player in the model and the lawmakers' beliefs for out-of
equilibrium paths are passive. Moreover, we relax the notion of truthfulness in Bemheim
and Whinston 1986 and follow Prat and Rustichini 1999 to give a weaker condition: {Qj}
is weakly truthful relative to P , if for everyj e Z and PeA,

/=»

y=i

This condition is similar to that of truthful contribution schedules in that the weakly
truthful contribution schedules keep the offers on the out-of-equilibrium policy proposals
high enough.
Given the passive beliefs, the lawmakerj proposes policy proposal P and accepts
the political contributions ]T*=[CI>(/>; ) if and only if

j?Cl (Pl)+aW(.P‘,p-l) i j r iC,(pi)+aW(P‘,p-i )
i= l

for any P 1 e Aly x...x

(2.13)

(=1

. If the set {P1,{Cv(Pi )"s,}/e2 satisfies (2.13), it also satisfies

the pairwise-proofness of McAfee and Schwartz 1994. Holding his belief that the offers
made to others are the equilibrium ones, each lawmaker j chooses a policy proposal to
maximize his objective function. As a result we find that lawmaker / s policy proposal
P ‘ is an interior solution in equilibrium if and only if the following condition is satisfied:
P ‘ earg

max

Y C J P ^ + a W i P ^ p - ’ ).

(2.14)

Under passive beliefs the lawmaker j maximizes of his objective function, and the firstorder condition of (2.14) is:
23
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£ VCtf(PJ)+aVW(PJ,p -j ) = 0.

(2.15)

r= i

Here, P~J is taken as being constant in program (2.14).
An interest group k takes the contribution schedules {C¥)JeZof all the other
interest groups /' * k as given. Let {PJ,P"j } be the policy proposal profile when all
lawmakers play the equilibrium policy proposals but lawmaker j deviate to A. The
interest group k knows that if it does not lobby, the lawmaker j will achieve his political
welfare
G 'k = m K Y C lj(P1) + a W ( P \p - ’)-,
that is, the lawmaker j will choose a policy proposal vector that maximizes his objective
function disregarding the interest group £s preference. Consequently, if the interest group
k wishes to affect the policy outcome, it needs to offer a contribution schedule that
provides the lawmakers with at least 2 J6z^/* • ^ ot^er wort*»

interest group k can

draw any policy proposal profile P e A'x...xA* from the lawmakers provided it
promises a contribution schedule that satisfies

C ,(P ')* C ;‘ -■£ci (P‘)+aW(P‘,?-/)
i*k

to each lawmakerj for his policy proposal P1. This is a standard participation constraint in
the principal-agent problem. This must hold with equality because the interest group k
does not want to give the lawmakers more than what is necessary to bring out a policy
change. The interest group kwill not choose P unless
P € arg max Wk( P ) - ^ [ G ] k - ^ ( P ^ + a W i P i ,?-*)]).
P e \ *._*A

je Z

(2.16)

ft*
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Since Gj * can be treated as a constant in this program, the policy proposal P must fulfill
the first-order condition
VW„(P) + £ { £ V Q (PJ) + aVW(PJ, P-J)} = 0.

(2.17)

JeZ l*k

Combined together, (2.15) and (2.17) imply

W , ( f ) = I V C „ ( P ')

(218)

jeZ

for all k e L . In fact, (2.18) is equivalent to
dWk

for all

dCfr

where /e{l,...,/i} and jeZ . Eq. (2.18) tells us that the contribution schedules

of each interest group to lawmakers are all locally and conditionally truthful around P ;
that is, each interest group's marginal contributions for changing each lawmaker's policy
proposal must equal the marginal benefits. Because each lawmaker holds passive beliefs,
in equilibrium, every interest group can make bilateral offer with him quite independently
of other lawmakers. Substituting (2.18) and (2.15) into (2.17), we find that
£ V JF t ( P ) + £ a V f r ( P ',p - ') = 0.
*EL

(2.19)

j* Z

Eq. (2.19) portrays the lawmakers1equilibrium policy proposals supported by the
differentiable contribution functions and therefore the equilibrium domestic prices.
Following the work of Bemheim and Whinston 1986, we adopt the notion of truthfulness
to define a conditionally truthful contribution schedule, which reflects the interest group’s
true preference conditional on the individual lawmaker’s beliefs for out-of-equilibrium
paths. Each interest group pays lawmaker j for his policy proposal P the excess of
25
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interest group's gross welfare at (P.F*) relative to some base level of welfare. As in
Grossman and Helpman, we take the form of a conditionally truthful contribution
function to be
C l{Pi ,p - \ B t ) = M a W , W k{ P ) - '£ C at{Pk) - B tj).

(2.20)

All equilibria supported by the conditionally truthful strategies are named conditionally
truthful Nash equilibrium. From Eq. (2.16), we have that

w,(P‘ ,p-‘)+Yd{T.c,(Pl’)+<iW(,P\p-i )+Yi c j (p‘)+ aw(pi ,p-‘)
"*

(2 .21 )

"*

k*i i*k

i*k

for all PeA. If the contribution functions are conditionally truthful, then from the
definition (2.20),
<:„(£') = < W ', /* " ')- I C J f * ) - ! , ,

(2.22a)

htZMi

here By is the equilibrium net benefit to the interest group k, and

Ct (P‘)iWXP‘

I C „ ( P ') - B ,

(2.22b)

heZMf

for all /sL, all j e Z, and all P 's A*.
Summing Eqs. (2.22) for /eL except k and then substituting the sum into Eq.
(2.21), we have
£ ^ ( P ^ p - ') + a f F ( P y,p - ') * £ W{(PJ,P~j ) + aW(P‘ ,P ~‘ ).
ieL

fet

Consequently, we can conclude that the lawmakerf s equilibrium policy proposal vector
of conditionally truthful Nash equilibrium, PJ, satisfies the following condition:
26
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PJ e arg

max

Y,W{(PJ,P~i )+ aW (P'

PJ e A , ^ » A ¥

for all ye Z.
Equation (2.23) says that, in equilibrium, the conditionally truthful contribution
schedules induce each lawmaker, who believes the others will propose equilibrium policy
proposals, to behave as if he were maximizing a social welfare function that weights
different members of society differently. This equation is very similar to the one in
Grossman and Helpman 1994; it brings out the behavior of each individual lawmaker
under the interest groups' conditionally truthful strategies. Comparing Eq. (2.23) with Eq.
(2.4) shows that there exists consistency between the setup of a single interest group and
that of the multi-interest groups. In addition, the first-order condition from (2.23) is the
same as Eq. (2.19). When the individual lawmaker hold passive belief and all the other
interest group are following conditionally truthful strategies, the interest groups treat
every lawmaker as an independent common agency.
The calculation of the equilibrium domestic prices is the same as that in the
previous subsection, and hence we can directly plug Eqs. (2.6) and (2.7) into Eq. (2.19) to
get the equilibrium tariffs or subsidies. Specifically, we have
Proposition 2. In the political system in which the lawmakers are symmetrical, if the
contribution schedules are differentiable around the equilibrium point, and if the
equilibrium are located on Aix...xAn, then the trade tariff taxes and subsidies satisfy
I
l+ /j
where a L

1 ,-a J ,
a + a Let

.
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Proposition 2 has the same structure of the equilibrium tariffs and subsidies as the
one in Proposition 1 of Grossman and Helpman 1994. Since each lawmaker holds passive
beliefs, in equilibrium, the interest groups can treat him like a common agency.
Moreover, the lawmakers are symmetrical, and hence they weight aggregate welfare in
the same way and share the power equally on forming the public policies. Consequently,
the policy outcomes under the linear process of lawmakers' policy proposals are the same
as the outcome under a single policy-maker. Even so, the assumption that the lawmakers
are identical and hold passive beliefs helps us to illustrate the interactions among interest
groups and lawmakers.
Suppose that efficiency means maximizing the joint surplus of the whole active
players in the model. The efficient policy proposal vector {P( },e(t )1( must satisfy the
following condition:
+

(224)

Plugging (2.6) and (2.7) into the first order condition of (2.24), we have the efficient
trade taxes and subsidies that satisfy
JL ssA z ffe L .
l+ £ za+ a Let
We can use the information revealed from the efficient taxes (or subsidies) and
equilibrium trade taxes (or subsidies) to tell the direction of distortions caused by the
strategic externalities. Using the strong set order to make the comparison of the efficient
domestic prices with the equilibrium domestic prices, we can show that the domestic
prices depart from free trade more under the equilibrium policy proposal profiles than
under the efficient policy proposal profiles.
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Now, we apply the algorithm of Lemma 1 in Prat and Rustichini 1999 to discuss
the property of each lawmaker's political contribution. If an interest group wants to
induce lawmakers to choose the equilibrium policy P and he tries to minimize his
political contribution ^ djaCv{Pi ), then its optimal political contribution schedule
must satisfy the following condition:

^ U

G{Pjn Z Ct f ( ^ )
'

;eZ

subject to C '(Pi ) + £ C l'( P lt)+aW (P)2Cv(Pi ) + £ C l' (P')+ aW (P )

for allj e Z and all P e A, x ...x A„.

(2.25)

However, the solution for program (2.2S) must satisfy the following condition:

l c „ (/=') = I (C;1-[£<?,(/» )+alT(P‘,p-‘)] I,
jeZ

JeZ

l*k

where
£ , ( ? ' ) = g - ; - Y , c„(Pl )* a W (P ‘,p-'),
i*k

and
c „{p ' ) z g

- ; - Y dc , ( p ‘ )+a w ( p ‘,p - ‘)
i*k

for all j e Z and all P e A, x...x A„. Thus

Y dC ,(P ‘ ) + a W ( P \p - ‘ ) = m M Y C , ( P ‘ )+aW(P‘,p - ‘ \
jeZ

^ eK i*k

Actually, this condition is derived from the participation constraint. All the participation
constraints must bind; otherwise the interest groups can profitably deviate by increasing
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political contribution for some lawmakers. The interest group which maximizes the
welfare of its members, must reduce its cost of implementing the equilibrium domestic
prices as small as possible, and hence the participation constraint is squeezed until binds.
2.4 Conclusion
This paper extends the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of common agency
to the multi-agent case. We assume that public policies are determined under a committee
system that reflects every individual lawmaker's policy proposal and we also compare the
results with those from the single-agent model.
Our results suggest that if the lawmakers in a committee are symmetric and hold
passive belief, in equilibrium, the lobbies' truthful political contributions will induce
every lawmaker to behave as if he were maximizing a social welfare function that weighs
the interest groups' welfare more heavily.
Moreover, since the lawmakers are symmetric, they weigh aggregate welfare in
the same way and share the power equally on forming public policies. Consequently, the
policy outcomes under the linear political process are the same as those under a single
agent model. This reinforces the results in Grossman and Helpman 1994.
Even so, the equilibrium policies are not efficient. Since each lawmaker is
partially benevolent, his policy proposal causes externalities on the other lawmakers'
objective functions. Moreover, the game is secretly played by players in the model, and
hence the lobbies can not publicly commit to her or his bilateral offers. Therefore, the
domestic prices depart from free trade more under the equilibrium policy proposals than
under the efficient policy proposals.
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CHAPTER 3. THE DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL FUND RAISING RACE:
A DIFFERENTIAL GAME
3.1 Introduction

Under the institution of representative democracy, the politician's professional
and personal success is often tied to financial contribution. No matter which party is in
rule, it seems unavoidable that the politicians from political parties collect money to
finance campaigns. However, politicians have nothing to sell but their policies as what is
portrayed in Grossman and Helpman (1994). They betray the public’s trust to sell public
policies for personal gain at the general publics’ cost.
Since political contribution has a marginal effect on the election outcome, the
interest groups design their contributions to the politicians to influence the choice of
policies rather than to influence election outcomes. For example, a lobbyist from
gambling industry, Fahrenkopf, in an interview with CNN (1997), simply said, "You
don't buy a vote. And, what money may buy you in Washington, to be very honest and
frank with you, is money may give you a hearing. It may give you the opportunity." In
other words, the political contributions may create accesses to influence government's
policymaking. Democracy itself does not seem a sufficient guaranty against the
corruption in which the politicians are seeking rents by creating rents.
But some economists from Chicago School claim that the political competition
will ensure politician to avoid the sneaky inefficient policies of redistribution, which
might cost him to be voted out of office. In particular, Becker (1976) and Wittman (1989)
question how voters can be persistently fooled even they remain rationally ignorant.
Friedrich (1972) also claims that there is an inverse relation between corruption and
popularity. In the United States, one of the political contributions, soft money, is derived
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so much criticism that the general public has been crying out campaign reform for a long
time. Actually, the soft money is a loosely regulated political contribution, which may be
given in any amount, but only to political parties, not to individual candidates. However,
it is possible that the parties' members manipulate the money to aid their candidates'
various expenses. Thus, soft money becomes an access of interest groups to corrupt
politicians.
The poll (1997) showed that Americans by a 63-24 percent margin support
banning soft money. Nevertheless, the politicians from political parties still expand their
collections of political contributions. In 1994, the political parties of the United States
raised a total of $101.7 million, of which only about $18.8 million was raised by the
congressmanal and senatorial campaign committees. In 1998, soft-money fund raised
more than doubled to $224.4 million, and the congressional and senatorial campaign
committees raised $92 million of that (see Miller and Sifry 1999). In addition, the
McCain-Feinolgold campaign-finance legislation is killed by the both political parties,
Republican and Democrat. In the first glance, the political parties seem to only care about
the collections of political contribution, even though there is a trade-off between parties'
popularity and the collection of soft money under fierce parties' competitions. The two
political parties' chase for soft money is like an ever-escalating arms race. The fund
raising race between the parties has been a hot public issue; however, there have been
few researches to examine why the parties are enthusiastic about collecting soft money
while have not much reaction to the public’s criticism.
Although there are some theoretical works on the corruption in some less
developed countries' governments, it is rare for the current economists to investigate the
pervasive parties' corruption in a modem democracy. Lui (1986) considers the impact of
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exogenous corruption deterrence and views anti-corruption campaigns as an effort to shift
from an unfavorable to a favorable equilibrium. Cadot (1987) considers the government’s
corruption as a gamble played by officials in a static framework. Within an intertemporal
framework, Feichtinger and Wirl (1994) argue that the trade-off between popularity and
corruption may lead to complex patterns in which for a dictatorship government
popularity is less important and cyclical, while for a democracy high popularity is
sufficient for stable regimes. None of these works touches the issue of bipartisan
corruption in a democracy.
In this chapter, focusing on the phenomena of political fund raising race between
two parties, we take a close look at the issue that the bipartisan corruption is the center.
The basic model we adopt is that of Feichtinger and Wirl (1994), in which the incumbent
political party has to trade off between popularity and money collection. Our main
conclusions are that: (a) If the competing parties are very similar to each other, they trash
the popularity, (b) The fund raising activity is considerably higher under subgame perfect
equilibrium than under time consistent.
The remaining of this chapter is organized as the following: Section 3.2
introduces a model of the two competing political parties that attempt to derive bliss from
popularity and money collection. Section 3.3 analyzes the time consistent strategies.
Section 3.4 studies the closed loop strategies and compares it with the open loop
strategies.
3.2 The Model

Here, extending the work of Feichtinger and Wirl (1994), we consider two rivalry
parties, which engage in soft money collecting activities and compete political power in
every dimension. Every individual party as a rational player maximizes intertemporal
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benefits from popularity and collecting soft-money. The amount of soft money collected
by each party implies its corruption depth; that is, more soft money the party collects, the
deeper the party is corrupted. The soft moneys can finance the party’s campaign
expenditure, but hurt its popularity if the party's fund raising activity is more vigorous
than its opponent’s is.
The party A's popularity stock is measured by scale p{t). The popularity per se
provides additional benefits to political party, and the discretionary power increases if the
people trust the party. x(t) is the political money rate collected by party A, andy(t) is the
political money rate collected by party B. If party A increases its soft money collection,
its popularity stock will decrease. However, if party B increases its soft money collection,
party A's popularity will be promoted. The following differential equation captures the
competing parties’ dynamic responses to party A's popularity:
p (0 = -x(/) + X 0

(3.1)

where p(0) = p 0 is given. Moreover the higher the value of p(t), the more the party A
benefits. But, the less popular the party A is, the more the party B gains. The both parties
appreciate political contributions.
The function W A(p) captures party A's bliss from its popularity; however,
W B(p) is the bliss of party B's popularity net from the pressure that party A's popularity
exerts over party B's popularity. Here, how the popularity affects the parties' bliss
depends on some exogenous factors, for example general public's perception about the
deals between the interest groups and political party, and the culture of economy. U A(x)
is the bliss that party A can get from political contribution x. UB(y) is the bliss that party
A can get from political contribution y. These two type of bliss are separable
34

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

W‘ (.) + [/'(.) where / = A or B. To ensure there exists an interior solution, we assume
that U and W have the usual properties: for party A, dUA/d x> 0 , d 2U A/ d 2x < 0,
dW A/d p > 0 and d 2W Aj d 2p < 0; for party B, dUB/d y> 0,

d 2U B/ d 2y < 0,

dW B/dp<0 and d 2W A/ d 2p < 0.
The objective of the parties is to maximize the present value of their bliss from
collecting political contribution and accumulating the parties' popularity. The both parties
discount their future utility by a discount rate r. We therefore get the following
differential game:
Party A

M a = ] e - ”l U \ m + V ' W < ) ) V l
0

(3 2a)

=]e-*[U’ (y(t))+W’ ( m V '
0

(3.2b)

Party B

Thus, a pair of dynamic optimization problems subject to Eq. (3.1) describes the fund
raising race between the both parties. The control variables are the amount of parties'
campaign fund collection rates x(t) and y(t); the state variable is party A's stock of
popularity p(t). To simplify our analysis, we confine this differential game to linearquadratic game for which the equation of motion is linear in the state and control
variables, and the objective functions are quadratic in the state and control variables.
In our further analysis, we use the following specification of the appearing
functions: for party A
UA(x) = c,x + 1 / 2 c 2 x 2 , WA{p)=a^ +aip + \/2ai p 2,
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and for party B
U B(y) = dxy + \/2d2y 2, W B(p) = b0 + bxp + \/2b2p 2
with c, > 0 , c2 <0, a2 <0, d x > 0 , d 2 < 0 , bx < 0, b2 < 0 . Since party A's popularity
has opposite impact on its opponent, axand bx are of opposite sign. The coefficients a2,
b2, c2 and d 2are negative to ensure the concavity of the both parties' objective
functions.
For the case in which ax = -bx, a2 =b2 and c, =dt ,

we call it quasi-

symmetric; furthermore, if the condition aQ= b0 is included, we call it symmetric.
3.3 Open Loop Solution

Proceeding in a conventional manner, we define the current value Hamiltonian
and current costate variables: For party A the current value Hamiltonian H A and costate
variable X fit in the function form
H A =UA +W A + X ( y - x ) .

(3.3a)

The Hamilton maximizing condition
x* = arg max H A

(3.3b)

X

reduces from interior solution to
H A =dUA f d x - X = cx +c2x - X = 0

(3.3c)

and it is assumed that such interior solution exists. Intertemporal optimality requires that
the marginal utility from fund raising equals the positive shadow price of popularity. The
following differential equation determines the evolution of the costate X
k - r k - dW AI dp - r X - a x - a2p .

(3.3d)
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The necessary optimality conditions in Eqs. (3.3b)-(3.3d) are sufficient if additionally the
limiting transversality conditions are satisfied,
lime-',A(0*(/) = 0.
t-*®

(3.3e)

For party B, the current value Hamiltonian H Band costate variable p fit in the
following function,
H* = UB + W B + p ( y - x ) .

(3.4a)

The necessary optimality conditions for maximizing H B are
H B =dU Bjdy + M=dl + d2y + M = 0,

(3.4b)

p - r p - dW Aj(fy = r p - b x - b2p ,

(3.4c)

and the transversality condition is
lim e~np(t)y(t) = 0.
(-HO

(3.4d)

The Hamiltonian maximizing conditions for interior solution and the evolution
equations of costates allow us to replace the costates. Using the differentiation of (3.3c)
and (3.3b) with respect to time to eliminate the costates leads to the following system of
linear differential equation in state and control variables
r = r ( x + —) - (a, + a2p)/c2,
Cl

(3.5a)

y = r(y + -j-) + (bx + b2p )/d 2 ,
dz

(3.5b)

p= y-x.

(3.5c)

The matrix gives the Jacobian of this dynamic system, which is evaluated at the
equilibrium
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The eigenvalues {e, / = / to J} of the Jacobian (3.6) are crucial to characterize the local
dynamics of the linear system that approximates the Eqs. (3.3). They can be explicitly
computed:
e,=r,

(3.7a)

e\ = 1/2[r ± yjr2 + 4(a2d2 + b2c2) / c2d 2 .

(3.7b)

Since (a2d 2 + b2c2) / c 2d 2 >0 all the eigenvalues are real and one and only one is
negative. Furthermore, we can compute the stationary solution of system (3.7), which
determines the long run outcome of campaign fund raising and its impact on their
reputation:

r(c2b2 + a2d 2)

m /

(3.8a)

p0 _ [r(cxd2 - d {c2) - (d2al - A,c2)]
c2b2 +a2d 2
Because the objective function and the state transition equation are concave in
state and control variables, the open loop equilibrium of fund raising activity is uniquely
determined. By the properties of the eigenvalues of (3.7), the associated stationary state
(3.8) is a saddle point. Moreover, since the intertemporal fund raising activities are linear
function of the state p, we claim the following proposition:
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Proposition 1. Party A's fund raising activities increases with respect to the state of its
own popularity, but party B's hind raising activities decline with respect to the state of its
opponent's popularity.
Proof: One can compute the fund raising activities in this form:
(3.9a)
ya= yl+ gi(p-pl),

(3.9b)

where

and

The detail derivation of f x and g, is shown in the Appendix. Since / , >0and g, <0 the
proposition is confirmed.!
This proposition reveals that: Since party A's money collection has negative
impact on its own popularity, there is a trade off between its money collection and its
popularity. When party A has more popularity, it holds more stakes in collecting political
money. Therefore, the higher the party A's popularity is, the more money it collects. The
contrary applies to party B. The higher its opponent party's popularity is, the more harm
there is for party B. Consequently, the lower party A's popularity, the more campaign
money the party B dares to collect.
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For the case in which the party A's popularity linearly benefit itself and harm its
opponent, we have a2 =0 and b2 = 0, and hence / , =0 and

= 0 . So, from equation

(3.9), we know that in this case the both parties make constant campaign fund raising.
From Eqs. (3.8), the quasi- symmetric equilibrium can be simply written as:

c2

rc2

p i = 0.

(3.10a)

(3.10b)

In order to guarantee the existence of positive fund raising activities x° and

given by

(3.10), we have to assume that
cy> a j r .
This inequality tells us that the positive impact of political money on the parties' bliss is
greater than the positive impact of popularity on the parties' bliss. Since popularity is a
state variable and directly affects the parties' utilities, the discount rate r enters this
inequality via the transition equation.
Eqs. (3.10) reveal that the smaller discount rate and the larger concavity of its
bliss function with respect to campaign fund raising lower campaign fund raising
activities. The constant terms of marginal bliss represent the direct benefit or harm of the
change in fund-raising activity or popularity. So, the higher the constant terms of
marginal bliss with respect to fund raising activity, the more vigorous the parties' fund
raising activities are. Moreover, since there is trade-off between party A's popularity and
fund raising activity, the larger constant terms of marginal bliss with respect to popularity
lower the parties' fund raising activities.
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The steady state of the dynamic, open loop and symmetric equilibrium (3.10a) can
be computed in the following heuristic way (this interpretation follows the algorithm in
the chapter 13 of Funderberg and Tirole 1990): Suppose that the parties are in a steady
state at open loop level (x“ ,_>>“), and let party A, say, increase its rate of fund raisingactivity by 1 during a period of time dt, and then revert to its previous rate of fund
raising activity once time dt has elapsed. The revenue of lifting fund-raising activity
during dt is (c, + c2x^ )d t. If this lifting fund-raising activity does not affect party B’s
fund-raising activity (this is the open-loop assumption underlying the steady-state Nash
levels), the extra cost for party A is

(3.11)

since party l ’s marginal cost is ax - a 2(-x° +y°m) and in the steady state x ’ =y". At
the Nash level, one must have
o
o
t^\
\
x i = y l = - ( — — -)•
c2 rc2
3.4 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
The open loop trajectories of the previous section are time consistent. They are
completely prespecified; in other words, the both parties completely ignore the
information about their opponent's popularity that is revealed over time. Time consistent
requires that the strategies need only be the best responses in the subgame starting from
the nodes on equilibrium path, instead of all subgames. However, closed loop trajectories
can be revised after it starts; that is, they are perfect equilibrium strategy which is the best
response in all subgames. Moreover, the closed loop equilibrium is always strongly time
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consistent which essentially is subgame perfect (Basar and Olsder 199S). Under this
interpretation, time consistent is less stringent condition than perfect.
Now we move on to derive a stationary feedback solution for the differential
game. We assume that the two parties choose the values of their controls at time t
depending on the value of the state variable at t. As we want to calculate stationary closed
loop Nash solution of the game, we have to find the continuously differentiable value
functions Q(p) of party A and S(p) of party B, which satisfy the following HamiltonJacobi-Bellman equations
rQ(p) = U A(x) + WA(p) +Q'(p)(y - x) ,

(3.12a)

rS(p) = U ‘90 0 + WB(j>) + S' (p)(y - x) ,

(3.12b)

x(p) = arg max U A(x) + W A(p) + Q (j>)(y(p) - x) ,

(3.13a)

X

y{p) = arg max U B{y) + Wa(p) + S' (j>)(y - x(p)),
y

(3.13b)

and the transversality conditions
lim e~nQ(p) = lim e ' rtS(j>) = 0,
r-*«

1-+00

which guarantee that the resulting strategies x(p), y(p) are admissible. In fact Q and S
denote the value functions of the two parties:
CO
J e-rt[U'(x(/)) + lT(p(/))<//,
X o
_p(t)=-x(t)+y(t),p(0)=pQ

X

(3.14a)

(3.14b)

0
p(t) = -x(t) + y(t), p(0) = p 0

The first order condition of (3.13) gives
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c, + c2x - Q { p ) = Q,

(315a)

dx +d2y + S'(p) = 0.

(3.15b)

Eqs. (3.15) simply state that in closed loop equilibrium the marginal cost of fund
raising activity is equal to the marginal benefit. They are equivalent to
(3.16a)

y-

4
d,

S'jp)
d.

(3.16b)

Eqs. (3.15) yield the optimal strategy in close loop form, provided that the value
function Q and S are known.
A closed loop Nash equilibrium consists of a pair of strategies x? and ^ that is
determined by Eqs. (3.16). To specify the equilibrium strategies, we need more
information about the value functions Q(p) and S(p). Thus, it is necessary for us to solve
these Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Eqs. (3.12) and (3.13). Formally, one has to solve a pair
of simultaneous ordinary differential equations. But, in general, there exists tremendous
technical difficulties to solve it by quaduature. Due to the bliss functional forms are linear
quadratic, we can take the usual procedure to reduce the analysis to linear quadratic
games.
Now, we assume that the solutions for the value functions Q(p) and S(p) are linear
quadratic:
Q{p) = <l»+<lxP+^<hP\

(3.17a)

S(p) = s0 +slp + - s 1p 2.

(3.17b)

Inserting the terms in (3.16) into the HJB Eqs. (3.12) yields
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Using the functional forms for the value function in (3.17), we get the following six
equations from the comparison of coefficient ofp in (3.18):
(3.19a)

0102
c2
02*2

*201 +*1*72
d2
02

(3.19b)

(3.19c)

(3.19d)

*1*2

*201 +*102
c.

(3.19e)

(3.190
Substituting variables among the six equations in (3.19) gives a consecutive elimination
of the variables that produces a fourth order polynomial equation for q2 or s2. Since it is
impossible to get analytical solution for a fourth order polynomial equation, we appeal to
the symmetric case to illustrate the feedback strategy.
Now, we go straightforward to the quasi-symmetric case, in which ax =-blt
a2 = b2 and ct =d{, i e {1,2}, and hence qx = - s x. The game leads to a three dimensional
non-linear simultaneous system:
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*t, =%&■+<!„
2c2

(3.20b)

2 r,!= " ^

(3 20C)

+ 2ai

The value of q0 might be calculated from (3.14), but we will omit these calculations, as
this term does not appear in the equilibrium strategies of (3.16). Solving (3.20a) and
(3.20b) gives
=

(3.21a)

« . = --------- j= = - ■

(3 2'1>)

Since the value functions Q and S are concave in p, we take the negative solution of
(3.20c). Inserting (3.21) into (3.16), we have the optimal closed loop fund raising
strategies for both parties respectively:
__£i_
XN

~

(3 22a)

‘—

^2

<

_______ 6a,
r,
/ I 2 12a,...
ca[S r+ ( r 2 + — ?-)]
V
Cm

= - A + --------------------------- A r - ( J r ‘ + ^ - ) K
c e r + c f & a

6

1

(3.22b)

c>

Eqs. (3.22) state that in equilibrium, play A's fund-raising activity increases with respect
to its own popularity, but player B's activity decreases with respect to its opponent's
popularity.
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Since p = y - x , p* = 0. For the subgame perfect equilibrium, the stationary
fund raising strategies for both parties are
x, K

+
c2[5r +

(

+_ L )j
C2

Now, looking at (3.10), for the symmetrical case, we have open loop stationary solution

The difference between x“ and x “ is

Thus, we claim the following proposition:
Proposition 2. For the symmetrical case, there exists a unique and stable linear Markov
subgame perfect equilibrium with the appealing properties that there are higher campaign
fund collection compared with the open loop equilibrium.
This proposition is great contrast to the results in Wirl (1994). Wirl presents a
dynamic model on lobbying in which the subgame perfect equilibrium lowers lobbying
activity and expense, and then argues it provides a partial explanation of the puzzle that
rent-seeking expense are often small compared with the prize sought. Since Wirl does not
compare the interest groups' gains with their contributions, he really fails to supply an
explanation to what he observes. Our model focuses on the phenomena that two
competing parties chase soft money and ignore the general public's criticism about their
corruption. Comparing with Wirl's work, it is far persuasive for us to apply a differential
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game to explain this observation. We also extend the one agent model in Feichtinger and
Wirl (1994) to a world in which each political party faces the challenges from its
opponent. It provides a more complete feature to portray a real world.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper considers the phenomena of political fund raising race between two
political parties, we assume that each individual rational political party derives bliss from
political campaign money and popularity. If collecting political fund implies the party
sells its services to the rent seekers, the party's popularity will fade as its fund raising
activity is more vigorous than its opponent’s is. Given these dynamic reactions, the two
parties have to trade off between popularity and money collection. We model the
interaction between the two competing political parties as a differential game. For this
game, We consider first a time consistent and then a subgame perfect equilibrium of the
linear Markovian type. In the symmetrical case, we find the parties trash popularity in
time consistent and subgame perfect equilibrium. Moreover, the subgame perfect
equilibrium considerably lifts political money collecting activities compared with time
consistent. This supplies a partial description about the observation: The political parties
in the United States ignore the general public's criticism on their soft money collecting
activities and engage in an ever-escalating fund raising race. The reason for this outcome
is that the dynamic closed loop strategies have built in the mechanism that each party
collect like political money for like. Whenever collecting mass money, the political party
knows that this gives a chance to its opponent to follow up and instead harms its own
popularity. This common knowledge encourages aggressive strategies in the beginning
and thus lifts the fund-raising activities of the political parties.
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CHAPTER 4. IMMIGRATION, BORDER CONTROL AND THE RELATIVE
BARGAINING POWER OF GOVERNMENT UNDER LOBBYING PROCESS
4.1 Introduction
The conventional theory of immigration proceeds on the assumption that the
immigrants to rich countries from poorer countries have less education and skill than the
rich-country workforce and therefore compete with the lower-income natives. But, the
increase of unskilled immigrants has the effects upon workplace productivity and raises
the income of skilled labors. As a result, the immigration of foreign labor may affect the
income redistribution of the host country.
In fact, there have been a lot of theoretical works on the effects of labor
migration, which is across country border. They have focused on the welfare impact of
migration, the distributive effects of factors, and policy measures (Ramaswami 1968,
Rivera-Batiz 1982, Ethier 198S and 1986, Kuhn and Wooton 1987, and Davies and
Wooton 1992). Among them, there exists a consensus that the distributive effects are
sizeable. In United States, the native or incumbent low skilled will lose as a result of
immigration — primarily through lower wage rather than increased unemployment; while
the additional low-skilled labor that results from immigration does raise the earnings of
high-skilled workers (Johnson 1980). Consequently, the immigration policy can be a
political issue because of the interest conflict between the two production factors.
To ease the interest conflict among different factors caused by the entry of foreign
labors, a government that maximizes its object function concerning immigration policy is
to control the inflow of immigrants. It is a straight perception that immigration can not be
controlled unless the host country secures its border against the illegal entry of foreign
labor. However, it will be a tremendous cost for a host country to make its border
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seamless. So, the optimal border control may just keep illegal immigrants in a certain
level rather than shut down the border. In fact, one often observes a host country
permitting some legal entries of foreign labors and simultaneously deterring the illegal
entries of foreign labors. This observation gives rise to two related puzzles.
Puzzle 1. An optimal policy for a small country concerning labor mobility is to let
foreign labor in until the marginal labor product is driven down to the foreign wage. That
implies that all foreign labor should be legally admitted for a national optimum. Puzzle 2.
If for some reason illegal entry should be deterred, why allow for legal entry of foreign
labor?
The existing models cannot account for the simultaneous existence of legal and
illegal immigrants and hence cannot answer these two puzzles. They either do not
distinguish two types of labor (most models) or assume that legal labor is non-existent or
outside the model (for example, Ethier 1986, Bond and Chen 1987 and Djajic 1997).
In this chapter, first we develop a simple small country model in an attempt to
study these puzzles. Here, there are three production factors and one sector in this
economy. The owners of production factors may overcome the free rider problem to form
interest groups and lobby the government for the favor of immigration policy. The
interaction between the government and the lobby is portrayed as in the common agency
model developed by Grossman and Helpman (1994). The basic frame we adopt is that of
Ethier (1986), in which the effects of enforcement policies designed to reduce the level of
illegal immigrant are analyzed.
Second, since our basic setup about the political economy is based on the
framework of Grossman and Helpman (1994), inevitably, it inherits some of their
extreme characteristics. One of them is that: The government has monopoly power in
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relation to multi-lobby but has no power at all facing a unique lobby. To relieve it, we
expand our one sector setting to be multi-sector and portray the lobby-govemment
negotiation as a Nash bargaining process. The relative bargaining power of the
government is no more extreme in the extension section.
Our main conclusion is that: If the production factors' interests are not all
presented by the lobbies, the political equilibrium is to set up a quantitative restriction on
the inflow of immigrants. In addition, if the marginal cost of deterring illegal immigrant
can not be covered by the marginal benefit of allowing legal immigrant for entry, the host
country’s best policy is to ban any legal entry and set up an optimal border control.
However, if a high enough lump-sum tax is imposed on the legal immigrant, the policy,
deterring illegal entry to allow a certain level of foreign labors for legal entry, is the
political equilibrium policy of host country. In the extensive part, we show that in the
short run the relative bargaining power of the government only affects the distribution of
the surplus, derived from the political process, between the government and the lobby;
however, it affects the immigration policy in the long run.
The remaining of this chapter is organized as the following: Section 4.2
introduces a basic model in which all the owners of production factors are presented by
lobbies. Section 4.3 analyzes the pseudo-political level of legal temporary immigrants.
In Section 4.4, we study the condition, for which border control and legal entry of foreign
unskilled labor can simultaneously coexist. In Section 4.S we expand our one sector
setting to multi-sector, and model the lobby-govemment negotiation as a Nash
bargaining.
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4.2 The Basic Model
Consider a small economy with three production factors, capital K, skilled labor#
and unskilled labor L. They are the inputs to produce a single goods, a numeraire. The
production function is linearly homogeneous and takes the form
f ( K , L , H ) - K aLfiH T where a, P, y> 0,and a + p + y = 1.

(4.1)

Thus a, P and y respectively are the shares of output for capital, skilled labor and
unskilled labor. We assume that the reward for a unit of unskilled labor f L{) is greater
than the foreign wage of unskilled laborw*; that is f L{)> w*. So, the foreign labors
have incentives to move to the host country to earn a wage, which is higher than that in
their own countries. The number of foreign labors, who want to move to host country, is
a function of the discrepancy between host country's wage and foreign wage. The larger
the difference, f L - w*, the more foreign labors, who want to immigrate to host country,
there are.
Suppose that the immigrants' income does not belong to the host countiy. The
government is to choose immigrant policies to maximize the country's income, and the
social optimal of immigrants allowed satisfies
A/* = arg max f ( K , H ,L + M ) - M f L.

(4.2)

Because the marginal social welfare with respect to immigrants (unskilled foreign labors)
is positive, the available social optimal level of immigrants should satisfy:

/,(•) =
Now, we assume that the government pursues its goals but not just the aggregate
income. It cares about the total level of political contributions and the national aggregate
income. The government is a democratically elected political entity, which the incumbent
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politician during his first term collects campaign contributions to finance the expenditure
of a later election. Here, we assume that, in this economy, every individual only owns
one kind of factors, and the owners of different factors may organize to influence the
government's immigrant policy.
As Olson (1965) mentions, the internal organization of lobby group is a matter
that is difficult to deal with because it involves so many details. Of course, tackling this
kind of difficulty will be an interesting challenge for us. However, this is not the issue
that we want to focus on. Instead, we assume that, in this economy, some of the
production factors can overcome the free rider problem and organize lobby groups to
lobby the government for favorable immigration policies.
The lobby that represents an organized specific factor makes its political
contribution contingent on the policy vector implemented by the government. We denote
by C'(.) the contribution schedule presented by the interest group /, where le { K , H ,L ) .
The net joint welfare of factor / can be expressed as
Vl =lfL - C ' (.).

(4.3)

To simplify our analysis, we choose a linear form for the government's objective
function, namely
G=

X C 'Q + f lT

<4-4)

le{K.H.L)

where W{) = £ /6{jeH£( lft is the aggregate income of domestic production factors and 0
is the weight that the government attributes to the aggregate income.
We are interested in the political equilibrium of a two stage, non-cooperative
game in which the lobbies simultaneously choose their political contribution schedules in
the first stage (prior to the election) to induce the government to set policies in the second
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stage (after the election). The interaction between various lobbies and the government is
portrayed as a game that has the structure of common agency problem. Moreover, the
features of contribution schedules also add another characteristic, menu action problem,
for the relationship between incumbent politician and interest groups. At a political
equilibrium, the immigrant policy and political contributions are determined as a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which is initially developed by Bemheim and
Whinston (1986). If the government's choice set is allowed to be continuous and the
contribution schedules are differentiable, we can closely follow Grossman and Helpman
(1994) and Dixit (1996) to derive the equilibrium in differentiable strategies.
Bemheim and Whinston suggest that there are multiple equilibria for this menu
auctions game; however, they further argue truthful Nash equilibria are stable to the non
binding communication among players and hence may be focal among the set of Nash
equilibrium. To simplify our exposition, we assume that the contribution schedules are
globally truthful. Under the assumption of global truthful political contributions, which
everywhere reflect interest groups' preferences, we can get a neat property. The
equilibrium policy vector P° of any TNE satisfies:
A t e £ / / ,( . ) + 0 K ( .)
tea

(4.5)

where £1 is the set of interest groups. This equation tells us that when the lobby groups
are following truthful strategies, in equilibrium, the government is induced to behave as if
it were maximizing a social welfare function, which the incumbent politician puts more
weight on the lobby groups than on non-lobby groups.
Now, suppose that the owners of these three factors well organize respectively to
be interest groups and the lobbies offer contribution schedules to the incumbent politician
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in exchange for favorable immigrant policies. The outcome will be the same as Grossman
and Helpman (1994) mention: “When all voters are active in the process of buying
influence, the rivalry among competing interests is most intense, and the government
captures all of the surplus from the political relationship.”
This can be more detailed if we look at equation (4.S). The government objective
function is equivalent to (1 + Q)W(.) Consequently, the lobbying activity will not affect
the government's decision. If the lobbies use truthful contribution schedules, in
equilibrium, the outcome under complete political influence (which all the production
factors exert influences by offering contributions to incumbent politician) will be same as
the outcome of social optimum. Thus, we have the following remark:
Remark 1. If all production factors have their interests represented by a lobby, then the
political equilibrium is social optimal, leading to a completely political internalization of
immigration policy.
The rivalry among competing interests induces the government behaves as if it
were maximizing a social welfare function that weighs different members of society
equally. Remark 1 highlights the interpretation of complete political economy.
4.3 Incomplete Political Economy
In contrast to the situation that all the production factors make political effort, we
assume that the unskilled labors and skilled labors can overcome the free rider problem
and respectively organize lobby groups to offer campaign contribution to the government
in exchange for immigration policies, while the capital fails to do so. This assumption is
crucial because it allows the government makes inefficient immigration policies to favor
the interest groups at the expense of not-lobbying groups. The lobby represented the
organized specific labor (skilled or unskilled) makes its political contribution contingent
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on the immigrant policy vector implemented by the government. We denote by C l the
contribution schedule presented by the interest group / where 1&{L,H). The net joint
welfare of skilled labors can be expressed as
V" =HfHQ - C H{)
and for the unskilled labor, the net joint welfare is
VL =LfL( . ) - C L(.).
The government's objective function is
G = C L(.) + C H(.) + 0fV(.).

(4.6)

The immigrant policy of TNE can be derived as the solution to the following problem:
Max ' E m + m ) .
W<0,»>/e{UO

(4.7)

This equation tells us that when the lobby groups are following truthful strategies, in
equilibrium, the government is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a social
welfare function that the incumbent politician puts more weight on the welfare of skilled
labor and unskilled labor.
Under this theme, we will lay out our analysis about the issues of immigration
policy. First of all, we set up some pseudo-benchmarks in which the host country is
immune to illegal immigrants, and the government under political influence is to choose
the equilibrium level of legal immigrants allowed for entry.
If there is no political influence from any interest groups, the social optimum still
calls for inflows of unskilled foreign labors until the marginal product of unskilled labor
equals foreign wage. Let M ° denote the number of immigrants that the unskilled labor’s
wage of host country is equal to foreign wage; that is, M ° satisfies
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w ' = f L( K , L + M , H ) .

(4.8)

Now, K or the owners of capital are not politically organized; however, the well*
organized interest groups, skilled labors H and unskilled labors L, use contribution
schedules to exert political influence. Because the temporary immigrants are not the
residents of host country, the social welfare of host country does not include the earning
of temporary immigrants. It is equal to /( .) - MfL.
The equilibrium immigrant policy of any TNE M n satisfies
= arg max HfHQ + L f L + * { /(.)-A//t (.)}.
Af€[Q,a>)

(4.9)

The first-order condition for (4.9) is equal to
W m . + V u . - W u = 0-

(410)

Rearranging (4.10) and using the property of Euler's equation for the homogenous
degree zero function, we can get
- Kfa - ( \ + e)M fu.= 0 •

(411)

So, the equilibrium level of immigrants, which are allowed forentry under political
influence, is equal to
M n = -V ia .

>Q

(1 + 0 ) /*
We name M n to be the pseudo-political level of legal temporary immigrants that
under the lobbying process the political economy outcome is to allow this level of foreign
labor in the host country legally. Under mild condition, this level should be smaller than
M ° . We plug M ° the social optimal level of legal immigrant into

-AT/t t - ( l + 0)M /*
and then we have
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-K fa - a + e w /u
= - f t a - (1 - m

+W y ^ r W ' V + M ° y - ' H ’ .

(4.12)

L +M

Thus we can use (4.12) to check whether M n is less than M ° . Obviously, if
< * -(!-/?)( 1+ 0)

L+M

(4.13)

then M n < M ° .
To satisfy (4.13), the share of output for capital a should be large enough, and 0
should be small enough. For fulfilling (4.13), the population of unskilled labors should be
large enough relative to the population of legal immigrants. Because the capital is not
politically organized, the interest group can induce the government to set up an
immigrant policy, which is much more at the expense of capitalists for a larger a. In fact,
its presence introduces inefficiency in an otherwise socially efficient equilibrium. As
Dixit (1996) interprets, the coefficient 0 sizes up the government's deal between social
welfare and contributions; smaller 6 suggests a less benevolent government. Furthermore,
if the population of unskilled labors is relatively large, it means that the interest group of
unskilled labors has more strength to exert political influence on the government and the
population of legal immigrant will not have much impact on the welfare of native
unskilled works.
4.4 Immigration and Border Control
Suppose that the foreign labors are not allowed to freely enter into the host
country. Then there are some public policies, which concern illegal immigrants. One of
the measures against illegal entry is to control the inflow of illegal foreign workers by
border control. To finance the expenditure of enforcing border control, the government
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collects income tax from the whole economy at a tax rate /. To simplify our analysis, we
assume that the firm of host country can completely discern illegal immigrant. Thus,
illegal workers and legal temporary immigrants are not included in the host country’s tax
base. The net joint welfare of skilled labors can be expressed as
V* = ( \ - t ) H f HQ - C HQ ,

(4.14)

and the net joint welfare of the unskilled labors is
V L = ( l - t ) L f LQ - C L(.).

(4.15)

The government's objective function is
G = C L(.) + C H(.) + 6W(.),
where fV(.) = Y

if l

(4.16)

| (1 - t)lf. . The immigrant policy vector of TNE can be derived as

the solution to the following problem:
max(l - t)LfL(.) + (1 - t)Hf„ (.)+ 6W{)

(4.17)

where Z is immigrant policy set and z is a component of Z.
4.4.1

Border Control and No Legal Immigrant Allowed

First of all, we assume that the host country forbids any foreign labor to enter.
Furthermore, we assume that the cost of cross border is constant and smaller than the
discrepancy between host country's wage and foreign wage. Since the wage of native
labor is much higher than the world average wage, there is an incentive for foreign
workers to illegally enter the host country.
To control the level of immigrants, the government chooses expenditure B to
enforce border control. Corresponding to B, there is a positive probability P(B) that an
illegal worker will be apprehended while attempting to illegally cross the border. The
probability is increasing in the resource that the government devotes to border
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enforcement. Furthermore, following Ethier (1986) we establish a standard assumption
that
P(0) = 0, P '(.)> 0 , /*'(.) < 0. />(.)< 1.

(4.18)

Let R(Jl ) be the foreign unskilled labors, who attempt to immigrate illegally to
the host country; it is a function of the wage of host country. Moreover, we assume that
0; that is, the foreign unskilled labors that want to illegally enter the host
country will increase as the unskilled labor wage of host country raises up. Because there
is no legal immigrant, the foreign unskilled labor who successfully enter the host country
is equal to
m

= R ( fL)[l-P(B)].

(4.19)

Then we have

.

rm

(4.20)

Eq. (4.20) states that the enhancing the border enforcement can deter more foreign
unskilled workers from illegally immigrating into the host country.
After some illegal immigrants successfully enter the work force of unskilled labor
in the host country, the production function of host country can be express as
f ( K , L + 1(B), H ) . The government of host country finances the border control by
levying income tax on these three domestic production factors, capitals, skilled labors and
unskilled labors. Because the illegal workers are excluded from the tax base, the
expenditure of border control can be expressed as
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Actually, t(B) = B /[ f (.) - 1(B)fL(.)], and hence the tax rate is a function of the
expenditure of border control.
If there is an interior solution for truthful Nash equilibrium, B ° , the equilibrium
enforcement of any TNE, satisfies
B° = arg max [1 - /(£)] [Hf„ (.) + L/ l (.) + 6[f(.) - 1(B)fL(.)]}.

(4.21)

o€[Q ,oo)

Then the first order condition of (4.21) with respect to border control is
[I - t(B)]{HfHLI'(B) + Lfu I'(B) + 6I(B)fu I'(B)}

- (' (5) {Hf„ (.)+hfL(.)+ e u o - m h (.)]
=

(4.22)

0.

Now, let B * is the border enforcement that satisfies 1(B)= M n , and thus
[1 - /( 5 * ) W /tt/ ,(2 0 + Lfa I'(B-) + e H B ' V J ' i B - ) }
~ * (B ' W
= - f (B

h (.) + l f t (.) + 9[f(.)

- I(Bm) f L(.)]

(4.23)

(.) + LfL(.) + e[f(.) - I(B‘ ) f L(.)] < 0.

Looking (4.10) and (4.23), we can make a comparison of the equilibrium illegal
immigrants with the pseudo-political level of legal temporary immigrant.
Proposition 1. If the lobbies from skilled labor and unskilled labor use contribution
schedules that are differentiable around the equilibrium point, then the equilibrium illegal
immigrants will be greater than the pseudo-political level of legal temporary immigrant.
This proposition simply states that: Since the border control is resource
consuming, increasing border control always- lifts tax rate and hence decreases the
income of the host country. Considering the negative marginal effect of border control on
the resource of host country, the government will set a looser immigrant constraint than
the pseudo-political level of legal temporary immigrants.
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4.4.2

Legal Temporary Immigration and Border Control

Suppose that the government of host country allows a certain level of legal
immigrants for entry and chooses expenditures B to control the inflow of illegal foreign
workers.

The

production

function

of

host

country

can

be

express

as

f ( K , L + M + 1(B),H). The unskilled labors include three parts, native labors L, legal
immigrants AS\ and illegal immigrants 1(B). Given the level of legal immigrants, AS, the
number of illegal immigrant is equal to
I(M,B) = R ( fL)(l-P(B)].
So, the marginal illegal immigrant level with respect to border control and the marginal
illegal immigrant level with respect to legal immigrant level respectively are
W

^ L
<0,
Wu. v - p m

i b (m , b ) = —

— <o.
i-ffO /ttD -W l

Since increasing the immigrants allowed for entry decreases the wage of the host country,
the marginal illegal immigrant level with respect to legal immigrant level is negative.
The Government finances the border control by levying tax on the domestic
production factors. The expenditure of border control can be expressed as
2?=/{/(.)-[A S+ /(£ )]/,} .
Specifically, the tax rate can be written as /(AS, B) = B/{f(.) - [7(B) + AS]/t }, and hence
the marginal tax rate with respect to border control is
to = /(—+ —
) > 0.
s KB / ( ) - [7(5) +AS]/t

(4.25a)

Moreover, the marginal tax rate with respect to the legal immigrant is
61

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

t

=

+/a )) < o

(4 255)

Since increasing the legal immigrants increases the income of host country, the marginal
tax rate with respect to the legal immigrant is negative. Plugging (4.25a) into (4.25b)
gives
tu =— (tB - - ) + ----------^ -----------.

(4.25c)

Under the process of lobbying, the government decides the equilibrium level of
legal immigrants and the equilibrium border enforcement. If there exists an interior
solution in equilibrium, the equilibrium border enforcement of any TNE B° satisfies
B° =arg max (1 -/(* )){# /„ + I f L + d { f( .) - [ l( B ) +M ] f L}}.
0€[O,oo)

(4.26)

The first order condition of (4.26) with respect to border control is equal to
(1 - t(B,M)){Hfm I B(.) + l f j a (.)+ 6 \ m + M ] f u I a (.)}
- t B{HfH +L/ l + 0 { /(.)-[/(5 ,M )+ A /]/t }
=

(4.27)

0.

Therefore, we can find an equilibrium border control B(M) which is a function of legal
immigrant. Further, we try to find an equilibrium level of legal immigrant. Taking
differential of the TNE objective function with respect to legal immigrant of unskilled
labor, we have
( l - t ( B , M ) W HLI u +Lfu Iu + 0 [ / ( f W + M ] / a / w}
+ ( \ - t ( B , M ) W HL +Lfa + d[I(B,M) + M ] f LL}

(4.28)

+ I / l + 0 { /- [ /( 5 ,M ) + M ] /t }.
Rearranging (4.28) and plugging (4.27) and (4.25c) into (4.28), we can simplify
(4.28) to be
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[TIg B" Jr <
/ y+ l^) Jrl +JIg- m
~Mn
(Al+

«

+ » f/-[W M )+ M ]/t(

= ^ f - * h { w , +Vl t « ( / - P ,w ) t W ,) .
*B

*B

"

Since
k + i = i (j M
a _
+1)<0
/,
/ , / / i - j p o / tt[ i - w ]
and
j ( B / , +LJl + 9 { /- [ /( f l,M ) + M ] /t )> 0 ,
we have
[ T ^ - r l i w * + i / t + 9 { /- [ /( S ,M ) + W l/t }< 0.
* B

*

It means that the cost of deterring an additional illegal immigrant from entry can not be
covered by the benefit of allowing an additional legal immigrant for entry. So, if the
government chooses a legal immigrant level at arbitrary M p and sets the border open,
this kind of policy is the same as open border for foreign unskilled workers, and then
native unskilled labor will be no better than the situation that no political contribution is
made.
Proposition 2. Because the cost of deterring an illegal immigrant can not be covered by
the benefit for allowing an additional legal immigrant for entry, the policy of allowing
limited legal immigrants for entry can not coexist with border control. Since no unskilled
foreign applicants will be admitted to enter legally, for the host country the only
remaining immigration policy-decision is to set up an optimal border control.
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There is a comer solution, for which the incumbent politician is to set up the level
of legal unskilled immigrants at zero. As a result, the possible choice for the government
is to set up optimal border control to deter foreign unskilled labor from crossing border.
4.4.3 Border Control and Imposing Lump-Sum Tax on Legal Immigrants
From the analysis of above, we recognize that it is impossible to find the
compatibility between border control and allowing a certain level of legal foreign labor
for entry. However, under the case in which the host country's government imposes a
lump-sum tax T on legal unskilled immigrant, allowing a certain level of legal immigrant
for entry and border control may be compatible. We assume that legal immigrants should
pay the lump sum tax immediately after they get the admission to host country. If T is
less than the expected cost of illegally crossing the border, the foreign workers of being
legally admitted to enter will be willing to pay.
Suppose that the tax revenue levied from legal immigrants' lump-sum tax is
contributed to the border control. The tax base for border control can be expressed as
B = M T + t ( / Q - ( M + m f L).
Obviously, t(B,M,T) = (B -7 M ) /(/( .) -( A / + /(2?)/t ), and hence the tax rate is a
function of the expenditure of border control and the tax revenue collected from legal
immigrant. Thus the marginal tax rate with respect to border control is
t„ = /{— -— +
}> o
s B - T M /(.)-(M + /( £ ) //

(4.29a)

and the marginal tax rate with respect to legal immigrant level is
tu = /{— - — +
<0.
"
B-TM
/ ( . ) - ( M + I(B )f L

(4.29b)
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Since increasing the legal immigrants can increase the host country's tax revenue and
income, the marginal tax with respect to the legal immigrant is negative. Plugging (4.29a)
into (4.29b) gives

I,

/( .)

If there exists an interior solution for truthful Nash equilibrium, the equilibrium
immigrant policy vector of any TNE (B° ,M°) satisfies
(B ° M ° )
= arg

max

Sc[0.<a>XAfc[0,co)

[1 - t(B,M, T){HfH(.) + LfL(.)+ « (/(.) - [/(B )+ U ] f L(.)» .

(4 30)

The first order condition of (4.30) with respect to border control is
(1 -

(•) + Lfu (•) + 0[I(B) + M ] f u (.)}/,

- tB{Hfu (.) + Lft (.) + 0{f(.) - [1(B)+M ] f L(•))}

(4-31)

= 0,
and the first order condition of (4.30) with respect to the level of legal immigrants is

(1 - 0

Wm. O

+

lfu . ( • ) +

T O +%

(•) V s

(1" 0 {H/ hl 0 + lfu. O + W ( B ) + W a O )
- tu [HfH(.) + L/ l (.) + 0 { f ( ) - [1(B) + W t 0 »
=

(4.32)

0.

Rearranging (4.32) and plugging (4.31) into (4.32), we have

B-TM

IB

"

^

(4.33)

+ 0 { f ( . ) - [ I ( B ) + M ] f L(.)}} = O.
In fact, equation (4.33) is equal to
-1
_
T
,
I*
( B - T M ) I b B - T M (B - TM)Ia

(4.34)

65

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Proposition 3. Suppose that the government of host country imposes a lump-sum tax on
legal unskilled immigrants, which is less than the expected cost of illegally crossing
border. If the tax is so high that in equilibrium the marginal cost of deterring an illegal
immigrant from entry can be covered by the benefit of allowing a legal immigrant for
entry, it can be observed that a host country permits legal entry of foreign labor and
simultaneously deters the foreign labor from illegal entry.
The left-hand side of (4.34) is the cost of deterring an additional illegal immigrant
from entry to allow an extra legal immigrant's entry. The right hand side of (4.34) is the
benefit of allowing an extra legal immigrant for entry. The first part of right hand side in
(4.34) is accrued by the reduction of foreign labors' incentive of illegal entry because
allowing an extra legal immigrant's entry lowers the host country's unskilled labor's
wage. The second part of (4.34) is the lump-sum tax collected from a legal immigrant.
4.5 Government's Bargaining Power and Immigration Policy

The model of common agency has an extremely unrealistic feature: When there
are more than two lobbies in an economy, the government seizes all the surplus of
lobbying process. On the contrary, when there is only one lobby in the economy, the
interest group captures all the surplus. Since there are more than two interest groups in
our previous analysis, the government has the monopoly power in the relation to the
interest groups. To undo this uncommon restriction, we adopt the model of Harris and
Todaro (1970), in which the economy comprises a developed urban sector and a lessdeveloped rural sector. We also follow the work of Maggi and Rodriguez-clare (1997)
and portray the deal between the government and the interest group as a Nash bargaining
process. In this section, what the relative bargaining power of the government in the
lobby-govemment negotiation afreets the immigration policy is analyzed.
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4.5.1

The Economic Structure

The economy is composed of two sectors, urban (U) and rural (R), and there are
two production factors of production, labor and capital. The total population of native
labor is fixed and equal to L . The capitals are sector-specific and fixed; Ku and K R
denote the sector specific capitals for urban sector and for rural sector respectively. The
economy is small in the sense that it can not influence world wage w*.
The native labors can move cross sectors in the long run but not in the short run.
Let L denote the native labors located in rural sector. The production technologies in the
both sectors are constant-retum to scale. The production function of urban sector is
Qu = F(KU, L - L) and the production function of the rural sector is QR = G(KR, L ) .
We can write the marginal labor productivity in the urban sector as ^(Z.) = FLwhere F(
denotes the partial derivative of F with respect to factor /. Diminishing returns to labor in
the urban sector implies

> 0.

Here, we assume that the foreign immigrants can work for the rural sector but not
for the urban sector. If there is no immigrant in this economy, in equilibrium,
FC(KU,L - L a) = GL(KR,La) where La is the equilibrium level of native labors that
work in the rural sector (see Figure 4.1).
If there are / units of foreign labors in this economy, the total labors in the rural
sector are l+ L . If there is no lobbying process within this economy, the objective
function of host country's government is taken to be the aggregate income of all native
agents in this economy. The aggregate income can be written as
Q(L,[) = F(K u, L - L ) + G ( K r,L+1)-IG l (Kr,L+ I).

67

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

G[ for p e [0,1)

w

0
r

£

v

L

Figure 4.1. Wage curves and equaMncome curve.

68

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The aggregate income of host country is equal to the output of the economy minus the
payment to foreign labors.
4.5.2 The Political Structure
We assume that the native labors in the rural sector organize as a labor union;
they are able to solve the free-rider problem and form a lobby. However, the native labors
in the urban sector and capitalists in the both sectors fail to do so. The union of the rural
sector lobbies the government to regulate the entry of foreign labor. Here, we assume that
the government can totally control the amount of immigrants. To compensate the
government for setting quantitative constraints on the entry of foreign labor, the lobby
collects contribution from the native labors of rural sector according to the number of
immigrants permitted. Suppose that the government does not allow for any immigrant
entry, then the labor union will reward the government contribution B(L), which is a
function of the native labors located in the rural sector. If the government allows / units
of foreign labor for entry, the contribution to the government is given by B ( L ) - c l ,
where c is the contribution deduction per unit of immigrant entry allowed. The lobby
seeks to maximize the welfare of labors in the rural sector. Its objective is to maximize
the returns to labor in the rural sector net of contribution:
V = LGl (Kr ,L + l)-[B(L) - cl] .

(4.33)

To keep the consistency with the previous setup we assume that the government's
objective is a weighed average of total welfare and contribution from the lobby:
'¥=Q(L,l) + aLB(L)-cl}.

(4.34)
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If a = 0, the government will set its immigration policy so as to maximize the national
income and choose open border. If a > 0, however, the government will regulate foreign
labors' entry if the appropriate contribution are made available by the lobby.
Here, we assume that the native labors in the rural sector can come together and
form an interest group but the native labors in the economy neither overcome the free
rider problem nor form an economy-wide interest group. In our simple setting, it is
equivalent to assume that there does not exist an economy-wide lobby. Thus, only the
short-run lobby influences the government's immigration policy. We also assume that the
native labors can make their decisions alone, and can not communicate with the others to
coordinate the places they work. We can thus think of the lobby from rural sector as an
independent player in the lobby-govemment negotiation; it takes as given the urban-rural
migration decision of native labor.
The timing of the game can be described in two stages. At stage 1, the native
labors choose where to work. Each native labor is small so he can not strategically
influence the other native labors' decision on work place. The native labors L allocated in
the rural sector outline the choices of the native labors in the first stage.
At stage 2, the government and lobby are involved in bargaining the level of
foreign labors allowed for entry and contribution. Since the bargaining between
government and lobby is occurred in the second stage, the government does not have any
commitment concerning the immigration policy in relation to the native labors. The level
of immigrants allowed for entry and the contribution are determined via the Nash
bargaining process between the government and the lobby. The disagreement point
(dltd 2) is assumed to be the existing state of affairs, in which the lobby contributes
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nothing to the government and the government keeps border open. dx and d z are the
values of the status quo for the government and interest group respectively. Let L° be
the total labors that work in the rural sector when the border is open. Then the
disagreement point can be written as dx = F(KU, L - L ) + G ( K R,L°)~(L° -L)w* and
d2 = Lw*.
The lobby and government bargain to solve
m

a

x

C

?

-

<

/

,

)

'

(

F

(4.35)

in which /? g [0,1] is the relative bargaining power of the government. Eq. (4.35) is called
the generalized Nash product, which is a product of the bargaining participants' gain net
of the disagreement point payoff. Eq. (4.35) can decide an efficient outcome; however,
the bargaining power f} decides the distribution of the gain in the lobby-govemment
negotiation.
Here, we assume that the government lasts long enough to care about the long run
state of the economy. For a government that can maintain its power for a long period, the
incumbent politicians are involved their chance of being elected. Thus, the government’s
objective function must include the political contributions and the welfare of general
publics; they are the significant factors deciding the chance of reelection in the modem
democracy.
4.5.3

The Political Equilibrium and the Relative Bargaining Power of
Government

First, let us determine the equilibrium urban-rural migration of native labors under
open border, which will be an reference for comparing with political equilibrium. Since
the return to the labor allocated to the urban sector is increasing in L, the curve f(L) is
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upward sloping and intersects the horizon line w* at most once. Moreover, since the
production technology is constant return to scale, Gl (Kr ,L) is downward sloping and
intersects the horizon line w* at most once. We assume that ^(0)<w* <j(L) and
Gl (K r , L ) < w * <G l (Kr ,0) to ensure that the both curves have an interior intersection
with the horizon line w*. The level at the intersection for the curve $(L), denoted by V ,
represents the equilibrium allocation of native labor under open border (see Figure 4.1).
If the government sets up the open border policy, the wage in the rural sector is
equal to w*. Some of the native labors will move to the urban sector until the wages of
both sectors are equal. When the labors in the rural sector can come together to form the
lobby, they shall lobby the government to set up a quantitative constraint on the inflow of
foreign labors. The presence of the rural sector's lobby leads to that the wage in the rural
sector should be higher than w’ ; otherwise, the lobby will not contribute anything to the
government. Under the lobbying process, the native labors settle down in the rural sector
will be more than under open border. However if the government's gain in the lobby
process is too small, the government may open border to increase the country's income.
As usual, to solve a two stage game we proceed by backward induction. In the
second stage, given the native labors' rural-urban migration choices (summarized by L),
the first order conditions of (4.35) are

ft(rlGu - a c W - d 2) ^ ( l - m G u +c)0F -< /,) = 0,
- # r / ( r - < / 2) + ( l- £ ) /e F -< /,) = 0.

(4.36a)
(4.36b)

Rearranging the first order conditions gives the outcome of the bargaining, {/ (£),?(£)}.
The equilibrium level of immigrants maximizes
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Q(l,L) + aGL(KRfL + f)L.

(4.37)

The expression of (4.37) can be interpreted as a social welfare function that weighs
different member of society differently: The native labors in the rural sector receive a
weight of 1+ a and the others receive the smaller weight of one. This is consistent with
the expression in Grossman and Helpman (1994). The first order condition of
maximizing (4.37) gives
T =a L .

(4.38)

The schedule / (L) can be interpreted as the short-run equilibrium immigrants allowed
for entry, given the allocation L of native labors. The level of immigrants allowed for
entry is proportionally increasing in the size of native labor located in rural sector. This
result is a direct consequence of the fact that /

maximizes the weighed objective

function (4.37). If a = 0, the function in (4.37) is simply the aggregate income, which is
maximized by opening border. If a > 0 the gross income component of rural sector’s
native labors, GlL, is assigned an extra weight in (4.37). More labor located in rural
sector implies a higher marginal labor income loss of allowing immigrant for entry. To
compensate this loss, the aggregate income must increase via increasing the labor in the
rural sector. As a result, the optimal / increases with/,.
The contribution can be express as a weighed sum of the aggregate income loss
from an quantitative constraint on the entry of foreign labor and the lobby's willingness to
pay for the government's immigration policy:
B (L)-c7 = m G d K * ,L + h - * ' ] )
1
~
+ -(i-P )m ,n -Q (L ,i)]
a

(4.39)
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where 1° =L° - L (see Figure 4.1). Note that if

= 0, the contribution is just enough to

compensate the government for the income loss caused by regulating the entry of foreign
labors. On the other hand, if /? = I the government obtains the all surplus derived by the
native labor of rural sector via restricting the entry of foreign in a certain level; the
surplus is equal to L(Gl -

w' ) .

Dividing (4.37) by L gives

J io . M
1
=

(4.40)

j i m a L(k r, l +T)- w']}+^£- iq(l ,i °)-Q( l,T].
L

aL

d is the payment of each native labor, who works in the rural sector, to the contribution.
In the first stage, the native labors have their expectation about the immigration
policy and contribution, which will be selected. The native labors migrate to the sector
where they expect they can earn higher income. At a subgame-perfect equilibrium, the
incomes of the native labors in the both sectors must be equal and hence the native labors
have no incentive to migrate across sectors.
Under the lobbying process, the wage in the rural sector is equal to
Gl (K r , (1 + a)L) given the allocation of native labor L. In the long run equilibrium the
returns of native labor in the both sectors must be equal; this income of the native labor is
the one that solve
GL(KR, ( \ + a ) L )- d (L ) = t(L)-

(441)

Plugging (4.40) into (4.41) yields the following expression for the equal-income curve:

<K=m+j{modK„L+h-w-])
(4.42)

+ x-z f - w , n - Q ( L , i ] .
aL
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If Gl (K r , (I + a)L) >G'l , the labors of the rural sector have higher income than those of
the urban sector do; the opposite happens when GL(KR, (1 + a)L) <G'L.
For/? = 1,
gl

~ g - l(l ) = w ' - m -

Since 0(0) < w \
Um(Gl -G-(L)}>0.
L -* 0

In Figure 4.1 we have drawn the short-run equilibrium wage curve and the equal-income
curve, which the government has all the bargaining power. Since
Ga <dG[/dL
A

for all L> 0*, these curves intersect once. Let L denote the level of L at the intersection.
A

Since L is the only allocation of native labor for which the short-run equilibrium labor
A

_

income are equal across sectors, L constitutes the unique equilibrium allocation. The
A

long-run equilibrium domestic labor income is then given by Gt ( £ H,(l + a)L) .
However for /? <1 the short-run equilibrium wage curve and the equal-retum
A

income curve may intersect not just once. Let X denote the set of these intersections. For
L e X and L < L \ 0 ( L ) < w \ so in this case L is impossible to be an equilibrium
urban-rural migration. If the rural sector's labor income is less than w*, the labor union of
the rural sector will not contribute anything to the government. So, the equilibrium
allocation L of native labor must be greater than L*.
Assumption 1. Gu £ 5G'L/dL for L ^ L * and GL >G^ for L = L*.
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To make this assumption holds, the marginal product of labor in the urban sector
decreases fast enough to dominate the possible change in the marginal individual
payment of the rural sector to the contribution. This assumption guarantees the curve
*
•
•
*
Gl (K r , (1 + a)L and curve GL intersect once for L £ L . So L is the only equilibrium
allocation of the native labors, for which the short run equilibrium incomes of labor in the
A

both sectors are equal; that is, L makes up the unique equilibrium allocation of the native
A

labors. The long run equilibrium income of the native labors is then given by <f>(L) .
Now, we give some intuitive interpretations for the fact that the equilibrium level
of the native labor in the rural sector is greater under the lobbying process than under
open border. Suppose for a moment that the allocation of labor is given by L = L*. At this
allocation, the return to labor would be equal across sectors if the border is open. Since a
small amount of quantitative restriction on the entry of foreign labor causes a secondorder aggregate income loss but first-order gain for the lobby, the lobby can profitably
buy the regulation of immigration from the government at a low expense. Therefore, the
lobbying activity makes the income of the rural sector’s native labors higher than the
income of the urban sector’s native labors; that is, GL(KR, (1 + a)L) > G l . As a result, the
native labors in the urban sector have incentive to migrate to the rural sector. The
migration from the urban sector to the rural sector drives the native labors L allocated in
the rural sector above C . When the rural sector is organized to lobby the government,
the government immigration policy will make the level of native labors in rural sector
larger than open border. Rearranging (4.41) gives
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for L > L ’ , the unique political equilibrium level of immigrants is decreasing with /?. Eq.
(4.43) simply states that the rural native labors' surplus under the lobby process is greater
than the weighed loss from restricting the entry of foreign labor.
Consider the extreme case P = 1. In equilibrium, we have
G[ = <f>(L) + [Gl (Kr , (1 + a)L) -w*] = GL(KR, (1 + a)L) ;

(4.44)

it implies <f>(L) = w’ . Thus starting at the open border, there is no migration between the
two sectors; the level of native labors in the rural sector will remain at the open border
size, L = L*. This happens because when the government has all the bargaining power,
the native labors in the rural sector get the wage GL(KR,(l+a)L*) at the expense of
their lobbing surplus. On the other hand, notice that the wage of native labor in the rural
sector is equal to GL(KR,(l+a)L*), which is higher than w*. But the lobby pays
Gl (KR,(l + a)L*)-w* for restricting the immigrant level at aL*. This suggests that
when the government is strong in relation to the lobby, the rural sector still has
quantitative constraint on the entry of foreign labors, but the allocation of native labor
will be the same as under open border. The next proposition summarizes these findings.
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Proposition 4. If L[G,(KR,L + 7)-w ']> ~[Q {L, 1°) - Q(L, / ] for L > L \ then (i) the
a
equilibrium allocation is decreasing in /?, with L>L* for /?e[0,l) (ii) the equilibrium
wage Gl (Kr ,(1 + a)L) is increase in ft, with GL(KR, (I + a)L)>w* for all /? in [0,1).
If p = 1then L = C , the net income of individual native labor is equal to w*.
The bargaining power plays an important role for the determination of
immigration policy. In the short run, the bargaining power has no impact on the
equilibrium immigrant policy; it affects only the distribution of the surplus between
government and the rural sectors’ native labor. When the migration of the native labors
between rural sector and urban sector is possible in the long run, the distribution of
surplus and the determination of immigration policy are no longer separate. In the long
run equilibrium the incomes of native labors should be equal. A change in the
government's bargaining power affects the allocation of native labors, and hence the
equilibrium level of immigrants is affected. In particular a higher bargaining power on
the part of the government leads to less native labors, who work in the rural sector, and
there are less foreign labor allowed for entry.
4.5.4 The Value of Commitment to Open Border
Suppose now that the government has a choice to commit to open border at early
stage say time zero. Assume that the lobby from rural sector starts operating only after
the native labors settle down in the both sectors, so that there is no lobby at time zero. To
examine the value of commitment to open border, we derive the government's bliss in the
political equilibrium and compare it with the bliss it would derive by committing to open
border. The bliss of the government in the political pressure can be derived from Eqs.
(4.34), (4.37) and (4.39):
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V ' = Q(Z, 7°) + fl(l + a)L(GL(KR, (1 + a)L) - w ' )

(445)

- /s T J r -G ^ .O + a )! )]
where 1 0 = L° - L and r = GK(KR,L°). Conversely, if the government commits to open
border, its bliss is given by

=Q(L*,l*) where I" =L° - L * . To understand the

relationship between 'Fp and 'F °, let us first consider two excreme cases.
First, for the case /? = 0 from proposition 1 wo knew that in the political
A

#

A

equilibrium the allocation of native labor is given by L > L . Since Q(L, I °) has highest
value at L = L*, (because increasing immigrant always increases aggregate income), it
follow that V
F° is higher than 'Fp .
Next, in this case ft = 1 the native labor allocation is L = L*. The equilibrium
level of native labors allocated in the rural sector is the same as the level under open
border. The only difference between 'P° and V
FP is created by the fact that under no
commitment of open border the government receives contribution from the lobby, which
obviously implies '¥p >

. Moreover

al[GL(Kr , (1 + a)L) - w *] - K r [r - GK(KR, (1+a)L)]

=a(Z[Gt (AT,, (I +a)L) - w1] - i[2(Z, f ) - Q(Z, 0]).
a

a

A

If (4.43) holds Y is directly increasing with /?. Under the condition (4.43) L is
_

a

decreasing in /? and W is increasing in P given L . It is easily for us to argue that 'P
is continuous function of P , thus we claim the following proposition:
Proposition 5. If L[Gl {Kr ,L + 7) -

w *]>—\Q(L,l°)-Q(L,l]

a

for L>L*, there exits a

level of the government bargaining power, P such that 'Pp > 'P° if and only \ i p > P .
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In this economy, the lobby from rural sector faces no opposition from competing
interest. For a common agency model as in Grossman and Helpman (1994), even though
the lobby from rural sector captures the all surplus from its political relationship with the
government, the government at least keeps a bliss level, which is the same as the one
under open border. However, in our model, when the government's bargaining power is
limited, the government's bliss may be less under political equilibrium than under open
border.
To analyze this, first we consider the case p = 0. In the second period, given the
native labor allocation, the government establishes a quantitative restriction on the entry
of foreign labors to benefit the native labors of rural sector and receives bliss, which is
the same as that under open border. In the first period, since the native labors rationally
expect that the government will restrict the foreign labors' entry on a certain level in the
forthcoming period, they migrate to the rural sector. If the economy is immune to the
lobby activity, the government will open border and the allocation of the native labors is
equal to L . The allocation of native labor L under rational expectation is greater than
I*. As a result, the government's current bliss under open border is different from the
bliss in which there is no political pressure on the government. In fact, the government's
bliss is less when the native labors anticipate that the lobbying process affects the
immigration policy than when there is no lobby activity in the economy.
When the government has some bargaining power fi> 0, the government can
collect political money by restricting the entry of foreign labors at a certain level. The
government must face a trade-off between the political money collection and the
aggregate income loss. The immigration policy pushed by the lobbying process leads to
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three effects: (a) A production loss in the rural sector is generated by forbidding foreign
labor moving in; since the government's reservation bliss is given by the open border
A

given L , this is always compensated by the lobby's contribution, (b) The Government
receives contribution in excess of the bliss that the border is open, according to its
bargaining power; the extent of these rents represents the government's cost of opening
border, (c) An allocation of native labors, which is greater than V , arises in the long run.
This allocation makes the aggregate income less than the aggregate income when the
allocation of native labor is/,*. This kind of loss presents even if the bargaining between
lobby and government breaks down, so the government does not get compensated for it.
Thus the loss represents the cost of not opening border. The effect b is opposite to the
effect c. The government weighs the two effects, and a higher P inclines to set a certain
level of quantitative constraint on the entry of foreign labor.
Now, we consider how the bargaining power P affects the equilibrium level of
immigrants allowed for entry when the government can exercise the option of opening
the border. If P is low, the government allow the foreign labor for free entry. If P is
higher than a critical level, the government choosos not to commit to open border and the
native labors receive higher wage than w*. The foreign labors allowed for entry are
decreasing with P . Also the net income of the native labor is decreasing with P .
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have incorporated the political model of common agency,
developed by Grossman and Helpman (1994), into the model Ethier (1986), which works
on the matters of illegal immigration. This kind of setup is to explain the issue concerning
the fact that a host country permits the legal entry of foreign labor and simultaneously
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deters illegal entry of foreign labor. First, we argue that if all the factors have their
interests represented by the lobbies, the political equilibrium is social optimum, in which
the national income is maximized and there is no restriction on the entry of foreign labor.
Second, it is shown that if not all the production factors' interests are presented by the
lobbies, the political equilibrium is to set up a quantitative restriction on the inflow of
foreign labors. Moreover, we confirm that if the marginal cost of deterring illegal
immigrant can not be covered by the marginal benefit of allowing legal immigrant for
entry, the immigration policy of host country is to ban legal entry of foreign labors and
set up an optimal border control. However, if a high enough lump-sum tax is imposed on
the legal immigrants, the policy, setting an optimal border control to deter the foreign
labors from illegal entry and simultaneously allowing certain level of legal foreign labor
for entry, is the political equilibrium.
To undo the unrealistic aspect of common agency model that the government has
the monopoly power in relation to several interest groups, we further extend the one
sector setting to multi-sector and adopt the Nash bargaining process to examine the
immigration policy when the government have varied bargaining power. We show that in
the short run the bargaining power only affects the distribution of the surplus between
government and lobby in the political process. However, the relative bargaining power of
the government affects the immigration policy in the long run. Moreover, we also argue
that the government may commit the policy of opening border to increase the aggregate
income and forgo the political contribution. The main reason is that committing to open
border increase the aggregate income; this benefit may outweigh the rent that the
government derives from the political process.

82

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

REFERENCES
Aidt, T.S. 1998. Political internalization of economic externalities and
environmental policy. Journal of public Economics, 69:1-16.
Basar, T. and Olsder, G.J. 199S. Dynamic noncooperative game theory. Academic
Press, London, England.
Becker, G. 1983. A theory of competition among pressure groups for political
influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98: 371-400.
Bergemann, D. and Vaiimaki, J. 1998. Dynamic common agency. Cowles
foundation working paper, Yale University.
Bemheim, B.D. and Whinston, M.D. 1986. Menu auctions, resource allocation,
and economic influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101:1-31.
Bemheim, B.D. and Whinston, M.D. 1998. Exclusive dealings. Journal of
Political Economy, 106(1): 64-103.
Besley, T. and Seabright, P. 1998. The effects and policy implications of state
aids to industry: an economic analysis, mimeo, London School of Economics.
Bond, E.W. and Chen, T-J. 1987. The welfare effects of illegal immigration.
Journal of International Economics, 23: 31S-328.
Bucci, G.A. and Tenorio, R. 1996. On financing the internal enforcement of
illegal immigrant policies. Journal of Population Economics, 9:65-81.
Buckley, F.H. 1996. The political economy of immigration policies. International
Review of Law and Economics, 16:81-99.
Cadot, O. 1987. Corruption as a gamble, Journal of Public Economics, 33: 223244.
Cesari, L. 1983. Optimization theory and applications. Springer-Verlag, New
York.
Davis, J.B. and Wooton, I. 1991. Income inequality and international migration.
Department of Economics Research Report No. 9111, The University of Western
Ontario.
Dawid, H. and Feichtinger, G. 1996. Optimal allocation of drug control efforts: A
differential game analysis. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 91(2): 279297.

83

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Dixit, A. 1996. Special-interest lobbying and endogenous commodity taxation.
Eastern Economic Journal, 22:375-388.
Dixit, A., Grossman, G.M. and Helpman, E. 1997. Common agency and
coordination: general theory and application to government policy making. Journal of
Political Economy, 105(4): 753-769.
Djajic, S. 1997. Illegal immigration and resource allocation. International
Economic Review, 38(1): 97-117.
Ethier, W.J. 1985. International trade and labor migration. The American
Economic Review, 75(4): 691-707.
Ethier, W.J. 1986. Illegal immigration: The host country problem. The American
Economic Review, 76(1): 56-71.
Feichtinger, G. and Wirl, F. 1994. On the stability and potential cyclicity of
corruption in government subject to popularity constraints. Mathematical Social Science,
28: 113-131.
Friedrich, C.J. 1972. The pathology of politics, violence, betrayal, corruption,
secrecy, and propaganda. Harper & Row, New York.
Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J. 1991. Game Theory. The MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
Grossman, G.M. and Helpman, E. 1992. Protection for sale. Working Paper
No.4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Grossman, G.M. and Helpman, E. 1994. Protection for sale. American Economic
Review, 84: 833-850.
Grossman, G.M. and Helpman, E. 1996. Electoral competition and special interest
policies. Review of Economic Studies, 63:265-286.
Harris, J. R. and Todaro, M. P. 1970. Migration, unemployment and development:
A two-sector analysis. American Economic Review, 60(1): 126-142.
Helpman, E. 1995. Politics and trade policy. NBER working paper 5309.
Helpman, E. and Persson, T. 1998. Lobbying and legislative bargaining. NBER
working paper 6589.
Johnson, G.E. 1980. The labor market effects of immigration. Industrial and
Labor Relations Reviews, 33(3): 331-354.

84

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Kuhn, P.J. and Wooton, I. 1991. Immigration, international trade, and the wages
of native workers. In: Trade, Immigration, and Welfare (Ed. R. Freeman and J. Abowd),
p. 285-304. Chicago: University of Chicago Press for the NBER.
Lui, F.T. 1986. A dynamic model of corruption deterrence. Journal of Public
Economics, 31: 215-236.
Magee, S.P., Brock, W.A. and Young, L. 1989. Black hole tariffs and endogenous
policy theory: Political economy in general equilibrium. Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press.
Maggi, G. and Rodriguez-Clare, A 1998. The value of trade agreements in the
presence of political pressures. Journal ofPolitical Economy, 106(3): 574-601.
McAfee, R.P. and Schwartz, M. 1994. Opportunism in multilateral vertical
contracting: nondiscrimination, exclusivity, and. uniformity. American Economic Review,
84(1): 210-230.
Milgrom, P. 1999. The envelope theorems, mimeo, Stanford University.
Milgrom, P. and Shannon, C. 1994. Monotone comparative statics. Econometrics,
62(1): 157-180.
Miller and Sifry. 1999. Soft money: It takes two parties to tango."
IntellectualCapital, Thursday, October 28.
Prat A. and Rustichini, A. 1998. Sequential common agency. Discussion paper
9895, Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University.
Prat A. and Rustichini, A. 1999. Games played through agents. Discussion paper
9968, Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University.
Ramaswami, V.K. 1968. International factor movements and the national
advantage. Economica, 35:309-310.
Rasmusen, E. 1994. Games and information. Blackwell Publishers Inc.,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Rivera-Batiz, F.L. 1982. International migration, non-traded goods and economic
welfare in the source country. Journal of Development Economics, 11:81-90.
Segal, I. 1999. Contracting with externalities. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
vol. CXIV, May, Issue 2:337-388.
Sesno, F. 1997, Oct. 7. A Payback? What do these donors get for their big bucks?
Access? Influence? CNN.

85

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Shimomura, K. 1991. The feedback equilibria of a differential game of capitalism.
Journal ofEconomic Dynamics and Control, 15:317-338.
Simon, J.L. 1989. The economic consequence of immigration. Basil Blackwell,
Oxford, UK.
Topkis, D. 1998. Supermodularity and complementarity. Princeton University
Press, NJ.
Wirl, F. 1994. The dynamic of lobbying: A differential game. Public Choice, 80:
307-323.
Wittman, D 1989. Why democracy produce efficient results. Journal of Political
Economy, 97(6): 1395-1424.
Poll: "Most say Clinton acted illegally or unethically". Allpolitics, Oct. 8 1997.
CNN.
Washingtonpost.com. 1998. Campaign Finance Special Report. Overview, Part 2:
The Issues: Whats for Sale? The Washington Post Company.

86

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

APPENDIX. THE PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 IN CHAPTER 3
To obtain a feedback characterization of the open loop equilibrium, we guess a
linear feedback representation of the controls to be
* ° = /o + /iP .

( A ll)

y°=go+giP-

(A
l-2
)

The substitution of Eqs. (3.S) into the differentiation of Eqs. (Al) with respect to time,
and the comparison of the coefficient in the differentiation of Eqs. (Al) yield the
following system of equations:

/

,

t

e

c2

c2

,

(

(A H )

A

2

.

2

)

C2

g i ( g o - f o ) = rg o +^ r - ^ j - >
2

(A2 2 )

2

g\(gx~f\) = r g \~ -

(A2-4)

2

The ratio between (A2.2) and (A2.4) yields

f\ = ~Mg\

(A3)

where M =d2a2fb2c2 . Plugging (A3) into (A2.4) gives
(l+ A O t f - r y .- ^ o .

(A4)

Solving (A2) gives
r ± J r 2 +4 (l+ M )^~
g x = — I ------------------------- ~
2.

Sl

2(1+M)

(AS)
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Only the smaller root in (AS) leads to a stable solution. Since the constant terms g 0 and
/„ are irrelevant to our proof of proposition 1 in Chapter 3, all we need here is
coefficients / , and g x. Because (3.7) ensures stability of dynamic system (3.5), we can
rewrite the optimal fund raising strategies for the both parties as

*°=xl+A(p-pl),
y° = y l + g i ( p - p l ) Specifically,

' - JVr I + 4(1+ Tb,c,
£ l>7
a ,2(1 + -2 -1 )
bzc2

<0>

(A 6)

and

rJ,’+
4<
l+
i£lA
/ , = - rfA
K ci

*---------. 11
2(1 + 2**2)
bzc2

1 >0.

(A7)
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